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Article
Secured Credit and Effective Entity Priority
CHRISTOPHER W. FROST
The historical and doctrinal development of secured
transactions and bankruptcy law has created a priority system
that is asset based. Secured creditor priority is tied to the value of
specific assets that constitute the secured creditor’s collateral and
not to the value of the debtor itself. And yet, in corporate
bankruptcy cases, lenders and their attorneys often assert broad
claims to the entire enterprise value of the entity—that is, to the
present value of the cash flows that the entity will generate as a
going concern. The doctrinal basis for such claims is often
unstated, however, and several commentators have criticized the
breadth of those claims under existing law. This article answers
those commentators and provides an argument that secured
creditors can establish a broad enough security interest to create
an “effective entity priority.”
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Secured Credit and Effective Entity Priority
CHRISTOPHER W. FROST *
INTRODUCTION
For about the past two decades, debates about the corporate bankruptcy
process have focused heavily on the role of secured credit in corporate
capital structures and the dominant position secured creditors are thought to
occupy in corporate reorganizations. The enactment of the Bankruptcy Code
in 19781 originally ushered in an era of management/equity dominated
bankruptcies. Early scholarship on the Code focused on governance debates
that envisioned corporate managers as the center of decision-making and
reorganization strategy.2 Chapter 11 strategy shifted from traditional
reorganizations to the use of Chapter 11 as a process by which entire
companies could be sold and the proceeds distributed, largely, to secured
creditors.3 As a result, that early view gave way to commentators’
recognition of the role that dominant secured creditors play in bankruptcy.
*
Everett H. Metcalf Jr. Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. I thank Chris
Bradley, Ted Janger, Bob Lawless, Thomas Rutledge, and Hon. Tracy Wise for their thoughtful
comments and criticisms. I also thank the University of Kentucky College of Law for research support
contributing to this Article.
1
11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1501 (2012).
2
See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control — Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code?, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 99, 247, 103 (1983) (discussing “the effects of the lack of
creditor control” and “the debtors’ de facto prerogative to remain in control of the business and continue
operations without supervision”); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity’s
Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125,
126 (1990) (reporting the results of a study of “the bankruptcy reorganization of large, publicly held
companies” and explaining the involvement of “thousands of creditors and shareholders” who “bargain
over the disposition of . . . assets”); David Arthur Skeel, Jr., The Nature and Effect of Corporate Voting
in Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases, 78 VA. L. REV. 461, 463–64 (1992) (focusing on corporate voting
issues). These articles focused on the relationship among managers, shareholders, and creditors during
the course of a Chapter 11 reorganization.
3
See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV. 673,
685 (2003) (discussing the control of the debtor in possession (“DIP”) financier); Harvey R. Miller &
Shai Y. Waisman, Is Chapter 11 Bankrupt?, 47 B.C. L. REV. 129, 153–55 (2005) (discussing the various
controls lenders can exercise in a Chapter 11 case, and concluding that “[t]he Chapter 11 process is
increasingly dominated by the ‘creditor-in-possession’”); David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditors’ Ball: The
“New” New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 917, 923–27 (2003) (describing
the increasing control of DIP financiers over the course of Chapter 11 cases). The role of secured creditors
in bankruptcy remains the subject of an active academic debate. See also Stephen J. Lubben, The “New
and Improved” Chapter 11, 93 KY. L.J. 839, 849–56 (2004) (discussing the implications of lender
domination); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 795, 860
(2004) (“On the analysis presented here, a takeover of the Chapter 11 process by one group of [c]reditors
would seem to be the occasion for concern, not celebration.”).
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Whether this transition from management to secured creditor dominance is
supported by the vast range of Chapter 11 cases—and the evidence is not
entirely clear4—the dominant role of secured creditors seems pervasive in
large bankruptcies. Indeed, the recent American Bankruptcy Institute
Commission on Reform of Chapter 115 focused extensively on the role of
secured creditors in the bankruptcy process. A number of prominent
bankruptcy scholars weighed in with their views—pro and con—in
connection with that study regarding the value and place of secured credit
both in corporate capital structures and in bankruptcy reorganizations.6
The debate has proceeded along two branches: one largely theoretical
and the other principally doctrinal. The theoretical branch of the debate
focuses on the economic justifications for secured credit, or, more precisely,
on the economic justifications for the priority accorded secured creditors.
Scholars writing in this vein have focused on the effect secured creditor
priority has on managerial decision-making, creditor monitoring, and
liability-proofing, and have sought to balance the perceived benefits of
priority against its social costs.7 More recently, these theoretical scholars
have turned to questions on the timing of priority determinations, including
discussions of absolute versus relative priority,8 options theory,9 and other
4

See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Secured Creditor Control and Bankruptcy Sales: An Empirical
View, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 831, 833 (2015) (“Our data strongly suggest that secured creditor control is
less pervasive than has been asserted . . . and that secured creditor dominance is not closely related to
363 sales.”).
5
The American Bankruptcy Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 was a comprehensive
review of the Chapter 11 process. Over 250 bankruptcy professionals participated in the study over a
three-year period and the commission’s work resulted in an extensive report containing numerous
recommendations. AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE, ABI COMMISSION TO STUDY THE REFORM OF
CHAPTER 11, at 13, 67–73 (Am. Bankr. Inst. 2014) [hereinafter ABI COMMISSION REPORT],
http://commission.abi.org/full-report (discussing at length recommended principles to protect a secured
creditor’s interest in a debtor’s property).
6
See Ralph Brubaker et al., Reforming Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 2015 U. ILL. L.
REV. 507, 507–08 (2015) (introducing the symposium issue of the University of Illinois Law Review).
7
The seminal articles include Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the
Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 883–91 (1996); Lucian Arye Bebchuk &
Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy: Further Thoughts
and a Reply to Critics, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1279, 1282–83 (1997) (arguing that secured credit is
inefficient because it relies on the presence of creditors who are unable to adjust their interest rates for
the increased risk imposed by the presence of a secured creditor); Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T.
Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1152–53 (1979)
(proposing a monitoring explanation for secured credit); Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in
Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49, 59 (1982) (providing a monitoring explanation
for secured credit).
8
See Douglas G. Baird, Priority Matters: Absolute Priority, Relative Priority, and the Costs of
Bankruptcy, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 785, 788–89 (2017) (suggesting that bankruptcy theory should consider
a hybrid system of relative and absolute priority).
9
See Anthony J. Casey, The Creditors' Bargain and Option-Preservation Priority in Chapter 11,
78 U. CHI. L. REV. 759, 760 (2011) (examining an alternative mechanism that would preserve the option
value of junior claims).
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mechanisms that might preserve value for unsecured creditors. These
works ask whether secured creditors should receive full priority as of a fixed
date (absolute priority) or should instead be required to compensate nonpriority creditors for the option value of their claims (relative priority). The
debates are not new,11 but they are being waged with a renewed vigor.
The other branch of the debate, the doctrinal branch, focuses instead on
the legal source and validity of the secured creditor’s claim, with a principal
focus on how that claim is limited by bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy rules
that closely associate priority with particular assets.12 These scholars remain
interested in the economic justifications for secured credit but view those
questions alongside broader questions about how expansive security
interests affect the bankruptcy process. A significant question raised by these
scholars is whether a secured creditor can legitimately claim priority in all
of the value of the business as a going concern (the “enterprise value”). This
position is an operating assumption of most, if not all, of the theoretical
analysts, but one that is challenged by those writing in the doctrinal branch.
One way to frame this doctrinal debate over the scope of secured credit
is to ask whether secured transactions law creates entity-based or asset-based
priority. Corporate capital structures are comprised of a mix of debt and
equity instruments creating priority in either the entity or the assets of the
entity. In large part, financial instruments and corporation laws create entity
priority. Debt is commonly understood to be prior to equity; preferred stock
is granted priority over common stock. Classes of debt can be contractually
subordinate to other classes. This entity-based priority extends to all of the
value within the entity and creates a waterfall type of distribution;13 each
level of priority receives all of the value up to the full amount of that level’s
claims against the entity and remaining value spills over to lower classes. In
contrast, secured credit, governed by Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
10
See Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of Process in
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 123 YALE L.J. 862, 870–71 (2014) [hereinafter Ice Cube Bonds] (providing a
mechanism to preserve the “reorganization option” in Chapter 11 sales).
11
Baird, supra note 8, at 786–87 n.3 (discussing early debates over absolute and relative priority).
12
See Edward J. Janger, The Logic and Limits of Liens, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 589, 592–93 (2015)
[hereinafter Logic and Limits] (seeking to establish the legal and practical “limits of secured lending
under non[-]bankruptcy law”); Michelle M. Harner, The Value of Soft Variables in Corporate
Reorganizations, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 509, 509 (2015) (discussing the characterization of soft variables
and the public policy and constitutional implications of how soft variables are treated in bankruptcy and
non-bankruptcy law); Charles J. Tabb, The Bankruptcy Clause, the Fifth Amendment, and the Limited
Rights of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 765, 766 (2015) (exploring the
constitutional limits on secured creditors); G. Ray Warner, Article 9's Bankrupt Proceeds Rule:
Amending Bankruptcy Code Section 552 Through the UCC "Proceeds" Definition, 46 GONZ. L. REV.
521, 521 (2011) [hereinafter Bankrupt Proceeds Rule] (arguing that it is improper to amend federal
bankruptcy law through the state uniform laws revision process).
13
See Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Tracing Equity: Realizing and Allocating Value in
Chapter 11, 96 TEX. L. REV. 673, 677 (2018) [hereinafter Tracing Equity] (discussing the “single . . .
waterfall[]” distribution that entity priority entails).
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Code (“U.C.C.”) and state real estate law, appears on the face of those laws
to be asset-based, with priority extending only to the value of particular
assets within the entity.14
This distinction has complicated debates over the bankruptcy process
for many years.15 Bankers and the attorneys representing them often think
about priority on an entity basis. The terms “blanket lien” and “firstposition” imply that the secured creditor’s priority claim extends to the cash
flow of the entity, rather than to the assets comprising the entity.16 The firm’s
assets are simply a means to generate that cash flow and the overall value of
the entity is determined by discounting that cash flow.17 In a world of entity
priority, there is little reason to deconstruct that value and attribute it to the
particular assets that contribute to its production. The firm is simply a box
of undifferentiated assets that produces cash for its owners. Firm value is
real, but the value of a particular machine tool or piece of unfinished
inventory within the firm is merely theoretical. In a similar vein, academic
debates over the bankruptcy process sometimes rely on entity priority as a
simplifying assumption.18
As several scholars have illustrated, however, the law of secured
transactions and the bankruptcy provisions that implement that law are assetspecific. Under non-bankruptcy law, security interests and mortgages attach
to specific items of property.19 Under the Bankruptcy Code, security
interests are “interests in property” and the priority rights appurtenant to that
interest are respected only insofar as they relate to the specific property. 20
The Code distinguishes between priorities in the “estate”—entity-based
priorities in the overall value of the debtor21—and interests in “property of
the estate,”22 relegating secured claims to the latter status.
The distinction between entity and asset priority is an important one, not
only when considering the ultimate distribution in a bankruptcy, but also in
14

Id. at 687 (discussing realization on real property).
See Douglas G. Baird, The Rights of Secured Creditors After ResCap, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 849,
860 (2015) [hereinafter ResCap] (“Whether one looks at a secured creditor as holding the discrete parts
worth less than the going concern or whether it enjoys a right to the first cashflows of the firm is a debate
that will undoubtedly continue. Resolving these competing views is virtually impossible. Both sides cling
to their views as if they were articles of religious faith.”).
16
See Erin Casey & Randy Klein, The Pre-Petition Right to Post-Petition Income Streams and the
Misinterpretation of § 552, 29 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec.–Jan. 2010, at 58 (“Cash-flow lenders . . . take
blanket pre-petition liens, basing loans not on the value of hard assets but on the present value of future
income streams. Value is not divvied up by asset, but is supported by the economic capacity of the assets
taken as a whole.”).
17
Id.
18
See Baird, supra note 8 at 792–93 (discussing priority schemes on an entity basis).
19
See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(12) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). (“‘Collateral’ means
the property subject to a security interest or an agricultural lien.”).
20
See 11 U.S.C. § 506 (2012) (providing a method for determining secured status).
21
See id. § 507 (providing priorities in the estate).
22
See id. § 506 (providing a method for determining secured status).
15
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allocating control rights during the reorganization. A secured creditor with
a claim to particular assets has priority that is limited to the value of those
assets and can assert a special claim to control over decisions made during
the proceeding only to the extent that the proceeding threatens to erode the
value of those assets. If a secured creditor can lay claim only to particular
assets, other sources of value, including the intangible value of the going
concern itself, are available to satisfy unsecured claimants who should have
some say in the conduct of the case. Thus, the right to adequate protection
of the secured creditor’s collateral is limited to erosions in the value of the
collateral.23 Beyond this, the secured creditor is entitled to no control—over
either the proceeding or the debtor—that is unique or distinct from that of
other creditors. If a secured creditor can assert a priority right in the entire
entity, however, that creditor can insist on full payment and, in the absence
of protection of that right, can assert control to the exclusion of the remaining
creditors.
Merely observing that non-bankruptcy secured credit laws create an
asset-based priority system does not necessarily foreclose a secured creditor
from taking what amounts to entity priority. If the scope of the security
interest is sufficiently broad, the secured creditor might be able to claim that
all of the enterprise value is subject to the priority claim. For the secured
creditor, converting asset priority to an effective entity priority is desirable
for two reasons. First, and most obviously, entity priority enhances the
secured party’s total distribution. If the secured creditor holds only an assetbased priority, determining the secured creditor’s distributional entitlement
requires some method of allocating the total value of the debtor to the
particular assets serving as collateral for the secured lender. Amounts
appropriately attributed to assets that do not serve as collateral or that are
not identifiable proceeds of collateral are shared with all of the creditors.
Entity priority, if it can be approximated, avoids thorny questions of value
allocation—particularly the allocation of going concern surplus generated
during the course of the case. The secured creditor with entity priority is
awarded everything up to the value of its claim.
Perhaps equally important is the reality that effective entity priority
provides an under-secured creditor with extraordinary control over the
course of the bankruptcy case. Because the blanket lien creditor claims a lien
over all of the property of the bankruptcy case at its full going concern value,
the debtor’s use of the property in its ongoing business operations requires
that the debtor either obtain the secured creditor’s consent or provide
adequate protection. If an under-secured creditor claims all that the debtor
owns, there will be no unencumbered assets available to provide that
adequate protection. This leaves the secured creditor in control over the
23
See id. § 361 (providing methods of adequate protection where the stay, use, sale, or lease of
collateral results in a decrease in the value of the secured creditor’s interest).
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debtor’s use of the assets—that control is often extensive enough to permit
the secured creditor to make decisions that are critical to both the debtor’s
future and the other creditors’ possible distributions.
This Article develops the argument that a secured creditor may cast a
net over assets that is broad enough to capture all of the value of the entity—
what I will call “effective entity priority.” The argument for effective entity
priority relies on the secured creditor creating a “closed system”—a claim
that every asset generated after the initiation of bankruptcy was generated
through the use of the secured creditor’s collateral. This closed system
approach requires that several conditions be satisfied. First, the secured
creditor must acquire the broadest possible security interest. Second, courts
must broadly construe the concept of proceeds of collateral, such that it
includes property resulting from any use of collateral. Third, the valuation
of collateral in a bankruptcy case must be conducted on a going-concern
value, not a liquidation value. A few cases have recognized this logic,
holding that the secured creditor’s lien extends broadly to all of the value of
the entity, but other cases reject such an analysis.24 Thus, confusion over the
exact scope of secured claims reigns. This confusion, unfortunately,
occupies considerable space in bankruptcy cases, and the issue should be
clarified.
Section I provides a brief primer on the provisions of Article 9 and the
Bankruptcy Code that establish the asset-based priority structure governing
secured claims. Under those rules, the bankruptcy petition effectively
freezes secured claims, limiting priority to the assets existing at the time of
the petition and to the proceeds that can be linked, or “identified,” to those
assets. New assets created post-bankruptcy are unencumbered by the
security interest, unless they fall within the definition of “proceeds.” Section
II introduces the closed-system analysis that might permit a secured creditor
to obtain an effective entity-based priority by arguing that all of the assets
contributing to the value of the debtor derive from the secured creditor’s
collateral at the beginning of the case. Through a successful application of
this analysis, a secured creditor can avoid difficult questions regarding the
allocation of value among secured and unsecured claims. Put simply, the
secured creditor would be entitled to full payment of its entire claim prior to
the distribution of any value to unsecured creditors. Section III pokes holes
in this closed-system theory by examining sources of value that cannot be
captured by the secured creditor’s pre-bankruptcy liens and post-petition
value that comes from sources other than the assets of the business itself.
Section IV explores some of the ways in which doctrinal arguments
regarding effective entity priority have been obscured by the nature of the
bankruptcy process and discusses legislative proposals that would restrict
secured creditors’ claims to effective entity priority. Section V provides a
24

See cases discussed in Sections I and II, infra.
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preliminary, normative case for providing direct entity priority. Allowing
secured creditors the ability to directly assert priority in all of the value of
the entity raises some distributional questions, but that might provide for
more efficient and certain bankruptcy distributions than are achievable under
the current, uncertain, legal regime.
I. BANKRUPTCY AND U.C.C. TREATMENT OF SECURED CLAIMS
Both the Bankruptcy Code and the U.C.C. (and related real estate law)
were designed as asset-based priority systems that accommodate traditional
commercial loans—such as floor-plan financing, purchase money security
interests, accounts receivable, and working capital loans. These asset-based
loans generally are one of two types: fixed asset-based or floating assetbased. Fixed asset-based lending is designed to finance relatively permanent
or long-term assets on a term basis, with repayment extending no further
than the useful life of the asset serving as collateral. Although the borrower’s
general creditworthiness is an important consideration in making and pricing
the loan, the value of the collateral throughout the life of the loan serves as
a critical backstop against default losses. Covenants in the loan agreement
typically relate to maintenance of the collateral, prohibitions against sale,
and insurance against casualty loss. The most straightforward of these loans
is the purchase money security interest, which relates to a single purchase of
assets that does not contemplate future advances and is not secured by afteracquired property.
Floating asset-based security is designed to finance working capital—
inventory or accounts receivable—assets that turn over on a relatively
frequent basis. Such working capital loans contemplate repayment and
reborrowing and are often of somewhat indeterminate length. Total loan
amounts are tied to the value of the inventory or receivables, and the loan
agreement covenants relate to both the maintenance of the value of the
collateral and control over the proceeds of the loan. Floor-plan financing of
an automobile dealer provides the archetype of these types of loans.
Article 9 of the U.C.C. is well-designed to accommodate both types of
loans through a regime of asset-based perfection and enforcement. The
perfection and proceeds-protection provisions generally work well to assure
secured creditors with continuing priority in the collateral. Article 9’s
provisions—permitting priority in after-acquired property25 and extending
priority to future advances26—assure that a secured creditor can efficiently
and effectively obtain liens on floating collateral. In addition, the default
provisions are designed specifically for asset-based enforcement, allowing
25
See U.C.C. § 9-322(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2001) (stating general priority
rules); id. § 9-322 cmt. 5 (explaining “[t]he application of the priority rules to after-acquired property”).
26
See id. § 9-323 (stating priority rules for future advances); id. § 9-323 cmt. 2 (“A security
agreement may provide that collateral secures future advances.”).
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the secured creditor to possess and sell tangible collateral and to collect on
intangible collateral such as accounts.
The Bankruptcy Code provisions relating to secured claims follow the
U.C.C.’s asset-based approach to the recognition and enforcement of
priorities. The cornerstone of this asset-based regime is section 506(a),
which bifurcates claims secured by a lien on property into secured and
unsecured claims based on the value of the collateral securing each claim.27
The secured claim designation carries through to the distributional
provisions of the Code, which require payment of the secured claim in cash
or property prior to the payment of unsecured claims.28 The determination
of a secured claim under section 506(a) is dependent on both the scope of
the security interest and the value of the collateral securing the claim. Putting
aside the valuation question for a moment,29 the question of scope is often
readily determinable by the security agreement documenting the
transaction.30 The Bankruptcy Code itself neither enlarges nor restricts the
scope of a non-avoidable security interest.31 Thus, in a simple one-off loan
on fixed assets, the security interest is determined by the description of the
collateral in the security agreement.
The scope problem becomes somewhat more complicated in floating
loan transactions that contemplate asset turnover. In those transactions, an
asset-based lender views its collateral as a shifting mass without identifying
the precise assets composing that mass. The U.C.C. accommodates this
approach by permitting priority to attach to after-acquired property32 and

27

See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2012) (“An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property
in which the estate has an interest, or that is subject to setoff under section 553 of this title, is a secured
claim to the extent of the value of such creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property, or to
the extent of the amount subject to setoff, as the case may be, and is an unsecured claim to the extent that
the value of such creditor’s interest or the amount so subject to setoff is less than the amount of such
allowed claim.”).
28
In a Chapter 7 case, property securing the secured claim is distributed prior to the payment of
estate proceeds. Id. § 725. In a Chapter 11 case, secured creditors are entitled to payment in cash or
property of the total amount of their secured claims. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A).
29
The value of the collateral often presents a closer factual question, and the standard for valuation
of the collateral is somewhat unsettled. As discussed in more detail below, courts are somewhat divided
over the question of whether collateral should be valued under a liquidation, replacement value, or going
concern standard.
30
See U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2001) (requiring a description
of collateral under the security interest).
31
Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (“Property interests are created and defined by
state law. Unless some federal interest requires a different result, there is no reason why such interests
should be analyzed differently simply because an interested party is involved in a bankruptcy
proceeding.”), superseded in part by statute, Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108
Stat. 4106 (1994).
32
See U.C.C. § 9-204(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2001) (permitting a security
interest in after-acquired property); id. at § 9-322(a)(1) (dating priority from the earlier of the filing of a
financing statement or perfection of a security interest).
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33

extending that priority to proceeds of collateral. By carefully structuring
and monitoring a secured loan, a secured creditor can have a reasonable
assurance that its priority will extend to all of the items constituting the
particular types or categories, without regard to the date on which each
particular item was acquired by the debtor. Also, by taking a security interest
in deposit accounts and by assuring that cash generated by the entity is
deposited in those accounts, the secured lender can assert priority over the
entire stream of assets as that stream flows through the debtor’s working
capital cycle.34
Outside of bankruptcy, it does not matter whether a secured creditor
acquires its priority in newly acquired property through a proceeds analysis
or through an after-acquired property analysis. Either method of obtaining
priority is equally serviceable.35 In bankruptcy, however, the distinction
between the two methods is critical. Section 552(a) of the Code provides that
the filing of a petition cuts off the effectiveness of an after-acquired property
clause,36 while section 552(b) generally allows a security interest to extend
to post-petition proceeds of collateral.37 Thus, after a petition is filed, a
secured party is entitled only to the value of its collateral and any proceeds
that can properly be identified as deriving from that collateral.
As Melissa Jacoby and Ted Janger have observed, by cutting off the
effect of after-acquired property clauses, section 552 of the Bankruptcy
Code creates an “[e]quitable [s]napshot” that fixes the assets included within
the secured creditor’s claim.38 The value of those assets is subject to the
requirements of adequate protection, and the actual realization of the secured
creditor’s claim is delayed until the end of the case. Post-petition increases
in value accrue to the secured creditor only where those increases are a result
of an increase in the market value of assets owned on the petition date. Once
those assets are disposed of, the creditor’s secured claim is fixed and the
creditor obtains a replacement lien on the proceeds.

33

See id. § 9-203(f) (“The attachment of a security interest in collateral gives the secured party the
rights to proceeds.”); id. § 9-315(a)(2) (“[A] security interest attaches to any identifiable proceeds of
collateral.”); id. § 9-315(d) (providing for continuous perfection of a security interest in proceeds under
various conditions).
34
G. Ray Warner, The Anti-Bankruptcy Act: Revised Article 9 and Bankruptcy, 9 AM. BANKR. INST.
L. REV. 3, 47 (2001).
35
See Bankrupt Proceeds Rule, supra note 12, at 523 (“[T]he main non[-]bankruptcy difference
between future assets that qualify as proceeds and those that do not is that the secured party must contract
for a security interest in future non-proceeds, but acquires a security interest in proceeds without the need
for a term in the security agreement.”).
36
11 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2012).
37
Id. § 552(b).
38
Tracing Equity, supra note 13, at 688–89.
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Most courts hold that proceeds do not include the general business
revenue of the debtor because proceeds must be linked to specific assets.39
Linkage is established in two ways: through the definition of proceeds and
through the requirement that proceeds be identifiable. Historically, proceeds
have been defined as “whatever is received upon the sale, exchange,
collection, or other disposition of collateral.”40 Where an item of equipment
or inventory is sold, the proceeds are the consideration paid to the seller.
Similarly, where an account is collected, the funds paid are proceeds of the
account. Thus, the historical concept of proceeds relies on the notion that the
item in question serves as a substitute for the collateral. This limitation is
illustrated by the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in In re Value-Added
Communications, Inc.41 There, the secured creditor held an interest in
telephone equipment used to provide state prison inmates with telephone
service. The creditor also claimed an interest in the revenues earned through
the provision of the service as proceeds of the equipment.42 The court
rejected the argument that the revenues were proceeds, stating:
Use is not a disposition of the collateral within the meaning of
the definition of “proceeds.” If fruits and products from the use
of collateral were treated as proceeds, every creditor with a
security interest in equipment would have a security interest in
all items produced from the equipment as well as the revenues
earned by the equipment.43
This limited, replacement-based approach to proceeds arguably has been
broadened by the 2001 revision of Article 9. The 2001 definition of
“[p]roceeds” includes not only amounts received on sale, exchange, or
collection, but also expressly incorporates amounts paid on long or shortterm leases of collateral and “rights arising out of collateral.”44 The import
of these changes is not entirely clear, but some commentators view the effect
39

See id. at 698–99 (discussing 1st Source Bank v. Wilson Bank & Tr., 735 F.3d 500, 504–05 (6th
Cir. 2013) (holding that accounts receivable are not proceeds of a security interest in tractors and trailers
that were used to create those accounts), Helms v. Certified Packaging Corp., 551 F.3d 675, 678–79 (7th
Cir. 2008) (holding that business-loss insurance is not proceeds of a security interest in equipment,
although a claim for the value of the equipment would constitute proceeds), and In re Gamma Ctr., Inc.,
489 B.R. 688, 695–96 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2013) (holding that accounts receivable were not proceeds of
security interest in equipment used to create those accounts)).
40
In re Value-Added Commc’ns, Inc., 139 F.3d 543, 546 (5th Cir. 1998).
41
Id. at 545.
42
Although the security agreement between the debtor and secured party described the revenues as
collateral, the financing statement failed to refer to those revenues, or the contract with the prison system,
as original collateral. Thus, the secured creditor’s only priority claim to the revenues was as proceeds.
Id. at 545–46.
43
Id. at 546.
44
U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(64)(A) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2001) (including lease
payments as property that is within the definition of “[p]roceeds”); id. § 9-102(a)(64)(C) (including
“rights arising out of collateral” as property that is within the definition of “[p]roceeds”).
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as moving from a “replacement model” to a “[value] ‘generation’ model.”45
The inclusion of proceeds of short-term leases particularly seems to augur
in favor of such an expanded model, because such a lease does not dispose
of the collateral but rather represents a payment for the use of collateral.46
Further, the 2001 addition of the phrase “rights arising out of collateral”
arguably expands the definition of proceeds to cover value resulting from
the use of collateral, in addition to value resulting from the disposition of
collateral.47 The reach of the phrase is controversial, however. Although
only a handful of courts have interpreted the phrase, some courts have
continued to hold that the concept of proceeds remains tied to some loss or
disposition of collateral.48
But even if the definition of proceeds is broad enough to include
property generated through the use of collateral, the U.C.C.’s requirement
of identifiability further limits the reach of the secured creditor’s claim.49
Indeed, most of the cases that limit the reach of the term “proceeds” could
as easily have been decided by focusing on the need to tie proceeds directly
to the original collateral.50 One often cited case, In re Skagit Pacific Corp.,51
makes the point clearly. There, the secured creditor claimed an interest in
cash an account debtor had paid on a post-petition account.52 The security
agreement granted a security interest in “owned or after-acquired equipment,
inventory, accounts receivable, chattel paper, general intangibles, and all
proceeds of such collateral.”53 Because section 552 of the Code cut off the
effectiveness of the after-acquired property clause, the secured creditor’s
claim turned on whether the new account could be identified as proceeds of
the pre-petition collateral.54 The secured creditor argued that the account was

45

Warner, supra note 12, at 521–22.
See R. Wilson Freyermuth, Rethinking Proceeds: The History, Misinterpretation and Revision of
U.C.C. Section 9-306, 69 TUL. L. REV. 645, 699 (1995) (“[T]here exists no functional basis in an
economic sense for treating the rents as proceeds and the accounts [generated by the debtor’s use of
collateral] as nonproceeds.”).
47
Bankrupt Proceeds Rule, supra note 12, at 522.
48
See Tracing Equity, supra note 13, at 698–99 (discussing cases). Compare 1st Source Bank v.
Wilson Bank & Tr., 735 F.3d 500, 504 (6th Cir. 2013) (finding “rights arising out of collateral” does not
include assets obtained by use of collateral), with In re Weirsma, 283 B.R. 294, 304 (Bankr. D. Idaho
2002) (finding “rights arising out of collateral” includes all claims, including punitive damages and extra
labor costs, that are associated with the loss of collateral), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 483 F.3d 933 (9th
Cir. 2007) (reversing on jurisdictional issue and affirming on all other grounds).
49
Tracing Equity, supra note 13, at 700–03.
50
The U.C.C. provides that this transactional link can be found through any number of mediate
transactions by making clear that the proceeds of proceeds are also proceeds. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(64) (AM.
LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
51
In re Skagit Pac. Corp., 316 B.R. 330 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004).
52
Id. at 332–33.
53
Id. at 333.
54
Id. at 335–37.
46
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proceeds because the debtor spent funds that clearly were proceeds in the
completion of the contract that created the post-petition account.55
The bankruptcy court accepted that argument and the debtor’s
documentary support behind it,56 but the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
reversed.57 The panel noted first that while the state law definition of
“‘proceeds’ should be given a flexible and broad content,” the requirement
that the proceeds be identifiable requires the showing of a “transactional link
between the proceeds and the collateral.”58 Thus, where proceeds are
commingled with non-proceeds, some method of tracing, such as the lowest
intermediate balance rule, must be applied to show that the proceeds truly
arose on the sale or other disposition of the original collateral.59
This identifiability requirement is sufficient to deny proceeds
characterization in many cases in which a secured creditor holds a security
interest in some, but not all, of the collateral. In re Residential Capital, LLC
(“ResCap”)60 illustrates this effect. There, a group of secured creditors with
a security interest in some, but not all, of the assets of the debtor61 claimed
an interest in goodwill generated in connection with a sale of assets during
the case.62 The court rejected that claim, noting that even if the secured
creditors could show that their collateral was used to create some of that
goodwill, other assets of the estate also contributed to its creation.63 The
existence of other sources of value interfered with the ability of the secured
creditor to satisfy the identification requirement.64 The court stated, “[e]ven
if a portion of the goodwill was directly attributable to JSN Collateral,
without any other additional resources, the JSNs have failed to separate the
value of that goodwill. Thus, the JSNs have not met their burden of
establishing a lien on goodwill generated post[-]petition.”65
ResCap points out the consequences of the asset-based character of
security interests under Article 9.66 An asset-based security interest will only
extend to value acquired by the debtor after the bankruptcy petition if the
secured creditor can show that only its collateral was used to acquire or
55

Id. at 334.
Id.
57
Id. at 342.
58
Id. at 337–38.
59
Id. at 338. Perhaps more precisely, the link must be to original collateral or to proceeds of original
collateral. Collateral can go through any number of proceeds-based transformations so long as there
remains a series of transactional links.
60
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. UMB Bank, N.A. (In re Residential Capital, LLC),
501 B.R. 549 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013).
61
Id. at 581–85.
62
Id. at 608.
63
Id. at 612.
64
Id.
65
Id.; see also ResCap, supra note 15, at 856–57 (discussing this aspect of ResCap).
66
In re Residential Capital, LLC, 501 B.R. at 614–15.
56
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create that asset. For assets like goodwill that are not attributable to any
particular asset, but rather to the value of the entity itself, demonstrating that
link will often be impossible.
II. THE CLOSED SYSTEM ANALYSIS AND EFFECTIVE ENTITY PRIORITY
Although the bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy laws governing security
interests seem clearly to create only asset-based priority, secured creditors
continue to argue that their “blanket liens” create a first-priority security
interest in the value of the entire entity.68 Creditors assert this priority to
support what they refer to as cash-flow loans.69 Cash-flow lending takes
traditional asset-based lending a step further by combining fixed and
working capital asset-based lending and attempting to extend the security
interest to all of the assets of the debtor.70 This extension is thought to
provide the lender another way to evaluate the risk of loss from default.
Rather than basing the loan solely on the value of individual assets securing
the debt, the cash flow lender looks to the present value of the future cash
flow of the business, or, put differently, the enterprise value of the entity
itself.71 Essentially, the legal position of cash flow lenders is that their
blanket liens cover everything, before and after bankruptcy.72
The basic idea behind this claim is that if the secured creditor holds an
interest in all of the pre-petition assets of an entity, any assets acquired by
the debtor post-bankruptcy, by definition, must be proceeds of that prepetition collateral. The debtor operates as a closed system where all
increases in value following the bankruptcy petition can only be attributable
to the pre-bankruptcy assets. As Douglas Baird put it:
67

Id.
See, e.g., Mark B. Wessman, Purchase Money Inventory Financing: The Case for Limited CrossCollateralization, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1283, 1289–90 (1990) (“If [a] secured party is the first to perfect his
security interest, his interest in the initial pool of collateral is already superior to lien creditors (including
the bankruptcy trustee), certain classes of buyers, unperfected secured creditors, and (with some
exceptions) secured creditors who perfect subsequently.”); CHAPMAN AND CUTLER LLP, YOUR
BLANKET (LIEN) MAY HAVE HOLES: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS MAY FURTHER ERODE SECURED
LENDERS’
RIGHTS
1
(Feb.
2,
2015),
https://www.chapman.com/media/publication/479_Chapman_Blanket_Lien_Secured_Lenders_ABI_C
hapter_11_Reform_020215.pdf (“Secured creditors have long assumed that if they possess a blanket lien
on all of a borrower[’s] assets, such liens will capture a debtor’s overall enterprise value, whether such
value is created prior to or after the commencement date of a borrower’s bankruptcy proceeding . . . .”);
69
Casey & Klein, supra note 16.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id. (“When an asset-based lender takes a security interest in every conceivable type of collateral
under revised Article 9 and real property law, the reasonable expectation of the parties is that pre-petition
liens attach to all post-petition sale considerations under § 552 of the Bankruptcy Code. Cash-flow
lenders similarly take blanket pre-petition liens, basing loans not on the value of hard assets but on the
present value of future income streams. Value is not divvied up by asset, but is supported by the economic
capacity of the assets taken as a whole.”).
68
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It is as if Firm consisted of robotic machines on a desert island.
No person and nothing ever comes or leaves, apart from
fungible raw materials bought at market price and final
products shipped to customers. As long as a creditor has a
senior security interest in everything at the moment the
petition was filed, any increase in value during the bankruptcy
belongs to this creditor. There is no other source from which
the value might have come.73
Through this analysis, a secured creditor might argue that its asset-based
claims effectively create an entity-based priority which extends to all of the
value of the debtor. The secured creditor’s claim therefore is entitled to full
satisfaction prior to the payment of any other claims.
This argument requires three conditions to be satisfied. First, the scope
of the security interests providing asset-based priorities must be sufficiently
broad to include all, or very nearly all, of the pre-bankruptcy assets of the
entity. Second, the concept of proceeds must be sufficiently broad to
encompass all of the assets that arise from the use of collateral, as well as
assets that arise from a disposition of collateral. Finally, the value of the
secured creditor’s collateral (and, accordingly, the value of the secured
creditor’s secured claim) must be determined under a going concern
assumption. If each of these conditions holds, all of the debtor’s inputs to
production (raw materials, labor, machinery, intellectual property, and other
intangible assets), and thus the debtor’s output, will be either collateral or
proceeds of collateral by virtue of the fact that they are purchased with assets
that are collateral or proceeds.
Qmect, Inc. v. Burlingame Capital Partners II, L.P.74 provides an
example of this sort of reasoning. In that case, the secured creditor claimed
a security interest in cash collateral that included payments made on
accounts receivable acquired by the debtor post-petition.75 The bankruptcy
court concluded that all of the assets, both pre- and post-petition, were
collateral for the secured creditor’s loans.76 On appeal, the district court
agreed without requiring the secured creditor to engage in a strict tracing
analysis or other method of identifying the post-petition payments to the
secured creditor’s collateral.77
In so doing, the Qmect court distinguished the facts before it from those
in Skagit Pacific, finding that the demonstration of a transactional link
required in Skagit was unnecessary.78 Because the secured creditor claimed
73

ResCap, supra note 15, at 858.
373 B.R. 682 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
75
Id. at 685.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 688.
78
Id.
74
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an interest in all of the property, “there were, in effect, no sources to which
the post-petition accounts receivable could be traced other than the secured
lenders’ collateral.”79 Thus, because the secured creditor had a security
interest in all of the debtor’s assets, “[n]othing other than secured lender’s
collateral could have generated revenue, so all assets, even those acquired
post-petition, were proceeds of the secured lenders’ collateral.”80
Although the closed-system analysis relies on the secured creditor’s prebankruptcy interest in all of the debtor’s assets, at least one court has used
entity priority concepts even where the secured creditor’s interest extended
to most, but not all, of the assets: in In re Hawaiian Telcom
Communications, Inc.,81 the debtor’s secured creditor had a security interest
in substantially all of the debtor’s assets, except for motor vehicles and
certain real estate and fixtures.82 The debtor proposed a reorganization plan
that was premised on an enterprise value derived from a combination of
methods, each of which reflected the total going concern value of the
debtor.83 Even at the enterprise value, the secured creditor was undersecured and so the plan awarded the secured creditor the enterprise value of
the business less the enterprise value attributed to the unencumbered assets,
which was allocated to the unsecured creditors.84
The decision effectively converted the secured creditor’s priority claim
from one that was asset-based to one that was effectively entity-based.
Rather than determining the amount of the secured creditor’s secured claim
in particular assets and providing priority treatment for that amount, the
court assumed that the secured creditor’s liens extended to all of the
enterprise value—except the small (less than 10%) value attributable to
those assets that clearly were not collateral.85 The court noted that its
approach dispensed with the need to value the assets encumbered by the
secured claim, stating that “[g]iven the extent of the Secured Parties’ liens
79
Id. Although the debtor had received a post-petition loan that was not subject to the secured
creditor’s interest, the proceeds of that loan were used by the debtor to pay other pre-petition obligations.
Id. at 684.
80
Id. at 688; see also Unsecured Creditors Comm. v. Marepcon Fin. Corp. (In re Bumper Sales,
Inc.), 907 F.2d 1430 (4th Cir. 1990). In In re Bumper Sales, the debtor had stipulated that post-petition
operations of the debtor were financed exclusively with cash collateral. In re Bumper Sales, 907 F.2d at
1433. Because the debtor’s cash collateral was the sole source of funds used to acquire new inventory
after the petition, the court found that the new inventory was second generation proceeds that were
“conclusively identifiable.” Id. at 1437.
81
In re Hawaiian Telcom Commc’ns, Inc., 430 B.R. 564 (Bankr. D. Haw. 2009).
82
Id. at 575.
83
Id. at 578. The valuation experts relied on a combination of a comparable company analysis, a
precedent transaction analysis, and a discounted cash flow analysis. Id. These analyses respectively
sought to determine the overall value of the company to the stock market in a mergers and acquisition
context and based on a more traditional present value of total cash flows. Id. Thus, each valued the
company as a going concern under various assumptions.
84
Id. at 586–87.
85
Id. at 575.
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as well as the proper enterprise valuation, there is no need to determine the
exact value of the encumbered assets.”86
Hawaiian Telcom provides a significant departure from cases like Skagit
Pacific in which the court required a transaction-based tracing of postpetition assets from pre-petition collateral.87 Hawaiian Telcom’s enterprise
valuation by definition incorporated the future cash flows of the firm88—
cash flows that would accrue only post-petition. By awarding the secured
creditor the lion’s share of that value,89 the court effectively found that the
secured claim included all of those post-petition revenues and valued the
claim on a going concern basis.90 The court dispensed with the difficult
questions regarding the identifiability of proceeds and included in the
secured claim all of the cash flows that could not be attributed to
unencumbered property.91
The question under this analysis is whether a secured party can show
that all, or at least substantially all, of the assets at the start of the case are
subject to the creditor’s security interest, and also whether the system can
continue to remain sealed against non-collateral contributions to the success
of the debtor during the reorganization. Both pieces of the argument are
necessary to avoid the equitable snapshot that fixes the value of the secured
creditor’s interest at the beginning of the case and fixes distributions at the
end of the case based on that value. Put simply, if the secured creditor is
entitled to everything at the start of the case, the secured creditor is entitled
to everything at the end of the case.
III. LEAKS IN THE SYSTEM: POST-BANKRUPTCY NON-COLLATERAL
CONTRIBUTIONS TO VALUE
The ability of secured creditors reliably to achieve effective entity
priority through a closed system analysis is far from clear. A number of
commentators have pointed out flaws in the notion that a secured creditor
with priority in assets can ever achieve entity or near-entity based priority.
86

Id. at 584.
Skagit Pac. Corp. v. Frontier Asset Mgmt., LLC (In re Skagit Pac. Corp.), 316 B.R. 330, 338–39
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004) (noting the insufficient tracking methods used by the creditor who should have
instituted proper procedures to have documents showing the “transactional link” between pre- and postpetition collateral).
88
Hawaiian Telcom, 430 B.R. at 577–78 (noting that the total enterprise value of Hawaiian Telcom
was calculated, in part, on the discounted cash flows analysis based on “projected future cash flows”).
89
See id. at 573, 577, 586–87 (recognizing the debtors’ proper allocation with the secured creditors’
claim of $300 million on a total enterprise value of $387.5 million and the class five unsecured creditors’
claim at only $12.3 million).
90
See id. at 603–04 (“There is no precedent that supports the conclusion that a secured creditor with
a lien on a debtor's primary assets is not entitled to the debtor's enterprise value when the debtor proposed
to use that collateral in its business under a plan of reorganization.”).
91
See id. at 573–74 (noting the secured creditors pre-petition collateral claim of $300 million
without any discussion as to tracing of proceeds post-petition).
87
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As noted above, the closed system argument requires that the secured
creditor’s interest encompass all of the assets of the business and that these
assets provide all of the inputs to the production and profit functions of the
business.92 The system must be sealed against non-collateral infiltrating the
debtor’s production processes and comingling with collateral as a source of
enterprise value.
There are a number of potential ways in which the closed system might
be infiltrated by non-collateral. Non-bankruptcy law places some limits on
what types of rights are subject to a security interest. Thus, taking a true prepetition blanket lien may be difficult, if not impossible. During the case, the
contribution of labor or efforts of managers might also be a source of value
that comes from outside of the system. Other non-collateral sources of value
have been identified by commentators. Michelle Harner has posited that the
enterprise value of a corporation is comprised partly of “soft variables” that
cannot serve as collateral either before or after the filing of a petition. 93
Melissa Jacoby and Ted Janger assert that the bankruptcy system is itself a
source of value separate from pre-bankruptcy assets94 and this value should
be partially available to satisfy unsecured creditor’s claims.95 This section
addresses each of these arguments—concluding that the case for effective
entity liability is a plausible one, despite these potential leaks in the closed
system.
A. Limited Scope of Security Interests
In order to avoid the thorny identification problems that often derail
claims to post-petition value, the secured creditor in Qmect was able to claim
a security interest in all of the debtor’s pre-bankruptcy property.96 Several
92

See supra Part II (explaining this argument and its implications).
Harner, supra note 12, at 519–20, 526 (explaining that soft variables include a company’s people,
the synergies created by operational efficiencies, strategic decisions, business plans, and relationships
among the company’s people—all of which are not a company’s personal property and so cannot serve
as collateral).
94
Ice Cube Bonds, supra note 10, at 892, 894 (“[W]e acknowledge that asset sales are an important
source of Bankruptcy-Code-created value . . . . Bankruptcy sales offer two distinct options that improve
on coercive state law remedies: preserving going-concern value through reorganization or through a
going-concern sale, under a plan or under § 363. This going-concern premium is a product of the federal
bankruptcy regime. Sometimes, the going-concern premium can only be obtained by acting quickly. Thus
a Bankruptcy Code created speed premium exists . . . .”).
95
Id. at 917–18 (questioning the assumption that the senior secured creditor owns the speed
premium because in the absence of a bankruptcy filing, the secured creditor would have to foreclose
under state law, so “a secured creditor asserting a blanket lien should have to purchase the option value
of the unsecured creditor’s claim if it is pursuing a sale”).
96
Qmect, Inc v. Burlingame Capital Partners II, L.P., 373 B.R. 682, 687 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2007);
see also In re Bumper Sales, Inc. 907 F.2d 1430, 1437 (4th Cir. 1990) (concluding that the proceeds used
by the debtor are identifiable to the creditor’s security interest because the debtor stipulated that all of
the post-petition inventory was acquired using the proceeds of pre-petition inventory and accounts, thus
eliminating the need for tracing).
93
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commentators, however, have argued that obtaining a security interest in
everything that contributes to post-petition earnings is impossible.97 Article
9 itself has a number of exclusions.98 More significantly, some licenses and
governmental permits necessary for the debtor’s operation as a going
concern cannot reliably serve as collateral because of limitations on transfer
and use that are contained in the contract or regulation creating the right.99
Consider, for example, a debtor’s right to conduct business under a
government license that prohibits assignability. Prior to the revision of
Article 9, this non-assignability provision facially precluded secured
creditors from taking an interest in the agreement.100 The inability of the
secured creditor to assert an interest in the license arguably placed the
economic value of the license—and the cash flows associated with that
right—beyond the reach of the secured creditor.
The 2001 revision of Article 9 dramatically expanded the scope of
property that may be claimed as collateral by permitting secured creditors to
take security interests in a broad array of licenses and contract rights that are
generally non-assignable. Under U.C.C. section 9-408, contractual, legal, or
regulatory prohibitions on assignability are ineffective to prevent the
creation of a security interest.101 Although a limitation on assignment is
effective to prohibit the secured creditor’s direct enforcement or control over
the rights constituting collateral, the provision accomplishes the goal of
permitting a direct security interest over the collateral that is effective before
a bankruptcy petition is filed.102
The innovation underlying the U.C.C. is to separate the right to operate
the business or use licensed rights from the right to the proceeds resulting
from the sale of the license—if a sale is permitted by the licensor. The use
rights remain subject to the licensor’s right to refuse to recognize an
assignment. The right to payment, however, is a separate property interest,
albeit one that is contingent on the licensor’s permission for the debtor to
97

See Logic and Limits, supra note 12, at 598–99 (noting the difficulty in tracing and valuating
proceeds of collateral because of the various forms the collateral may take after its sale, disposal, or
transformation, particularly when it comes to intellectual property developments post-petition); see also
ResCap, supra note 15, at 858 (discussing the complications which may arise because while priority is
tied to discrete assets, a company is greater than the sum of its parts).
98
See U.C.C. § 9-109(d) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2001) (listing transactions
excluded from Article 9). However, state or federal law might provide alternate means for a creditor to
obtain a security interest in property excluded from the scope of Article 9.
99
ResCap, supra note 15, at 857 (“With respect to some types of collateral, such as FCC licenses
or patents or copyrights or real property, [tracing a secured creditor’s pre-petition] security interests is
difficult or uncertain.”).
100
See U.C.C. app. AA § 9-408 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (noting that
amendments to this section made restrictions on assignment “generally ineffective”).
101
U.C.C. § 9-408(c) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2001).
102
See id. § 9-408 cmt. 2 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2001) (stating that this section
makes ineffective any attempt to restrict the assignment of a general intangible which “leaves the account
debtor’s or obligated person’s rights and obligations unaffected”).
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assign the license. Because the right to payment exists separately, the right
to receive it arises even before the licensed thing is sold—that is, prepetition. This designation permits the value of the license to be proceeds
rather than after-acquired property, thereby including the value of the license
in the secured creditor’s secured claim.
This approach codified a line of pre-revision cases which held that future
income streams tied to a license or franchise were separate property that,
although unrealized, constituted personal property that could be pledged as
collateral apart from the underlying franchise or license. In one such case,
In re SRJ Enterprises, Inc., the debtor, a Nissan dealer, arranged a sale of all
of its assets as a going concern.104 The terms of the sale required the debtor
to terminate its rights under its Nissan franchise so that the buyer could
obtain a new franchise at that location.105 The debtor’s motion for approval
of the sale allocated a portion of the sale price to the “Goodwill in Nissan
Agreement”—and the secured creditor claimed the amount as proceeds of
its security interest in general intangibles.106 Although the secured creditor
did not hold a security interest in the non-assignable franchise itself, the
court found that the proceeds attributed to the franchise were proceeds of its
pre-petition rights in the market share or goodwill represented by the
franchise:
An automobile floor planning financier may contemplate a
bankruptcy filing by its borrower and take security in the
inherent value of its borrower's market share. There is no
reason why this value, or general intangibles such as goodwill
and going concern value, cannot be deemed collateral separate
from and derivative of the franchise.107
Thus, value represented by a right, opportunity, or advantage, even one
that is not separately transferable by the debtor, may exist as a general
intangible before the petition—and proceeds from the sale of that right are
included within the scope of the secured claim.
Similarly, in In re Tracy Broadcasting Corp., the Tenth Circuit
recognized that one could take a security interest in the future right of a
licensee to receive proceeds from the sale of an FCC broadcast license 108
103

See G. Ray Warner, The Anti-Bankruptcy Act: Revised Article 9 and Bankruptcy, 9 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 3, 49 (2001) (“The revision distinguishes between non-economic rights and the payment
rights and proceeds that might be generated by the intangible asset.”).
104
NBD Park Ridge Bank v. SRJ Enters., Inc. (In re SRJ Enters., Inc.), 150 B.R. 933, 935 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1993).
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 940 (emphasis omitted).
108
In re Tracy Broad. Corp., 696 F.3d 1051, 1061 (10th Cir. 2012) (“If the security interest could
not attach before there was a contract for the sale of the license, the interest would have little value,
particularly when the sale results from financial problems of the licensee, the very circumstance for which
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without having an interest in the use of the electromagnetic spectrum that
the license granted the licensee.109 The court held that, although the secured
creditor does not obtain an enforceable right to use the spectrum, it can
obtain a present (pre-petition) right to proceeds that may arise on the sale of
the debtor’s rights under the license.110 Turning to the U.C.C., the court held
that the secured creditor’s interest in pre-petition general intangibles
extended to the future right to receive the proceeds of the license.111 The
court concluded that value generated from the sale of the license constituted
“proceeds” for purposes of section 552 of the Code and not after-acquired
property.112 Thus, the secured creditor’s lien extended to the amounts that
were (or would be)113 received from such a sale.114
The importance of such analysis to a secured creditor’s claim of
effective entity priority is highlighted by In re Ridgely Communications,
Inc., another case involving a broadcast license.115 There, following the sale
of all of the assets of the debtor to a third party, the debtor filed a motion to
value the collateral and non-collateral and claimed that that valuation would
leave substantial proceeds available to satisfy unsecured claims.116 The
broadcast license, the debtor argued, could not be encumbered by the
security interest and thus the secured creditor should receive only the
liquidation value of the hard assets serving as collateral.117 The court
concluded:
Because Ameritrust had a perfected security interest in all of
the assets covered by the court-approved sale, the Court finds
it unnecessary to address the issue of the valuation of the
individual assets. The station was sold as a going-concern in

a creditor desires protection. We can see no policy reason to prevent the attachment of a security interest
in the right of the licensee (the right to proceeds of the license’s sale) . . . .”).
109
Id. at 1055 (“[A] licensee has no ownership rights in a channel of radio transmission or a
frequency of the electromagnetic spectrum . . . .”).
110
Id. (“[T]he FCA does not prohibit a licensee from making money from its license—say, when a
licensee sells a license (albeit only with FCC approval) and realizes a profit because of the value of
listener loyalty to the frequency used by the licensee.”).
111
Id. at 1064 (“[U.C.C.] Section 9-408 implicitly recognizes (and the comments to the section
explicitly endorse) that a lien on the right to sale proceeds of a government license can attach when a
lender extends credit to a licensee.”).
112
Id. at 1060 (“In our view, Nebraska law recognizes the attachment of an interest in the right to
proceeds of a sale of an FCC license when the licensee enters into a security agreement.”).
113
Id. at 1052. It is unclear from the decision whether the license was, in fact, ever sold because the
case sought a declaratory judgment of a creditor’s interest.
114
See id. at 1053 (“We conclude that despite the FCA restrictions on license transfers, Tracy
Broadcasting could grant a security interest in its right to the proceeds of the sale of the license.”).
115
In re Ridgely Commc’ns, Inc., 139 B.R. 374, 375 (Bankr. D. Md. 1992).
116
Id. at 376.
117
Id. at 375–76.
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an arms-length transaction and Ameritrust is entitled to the
proceeds from the sale as approved by the Court.118
Although this analysis provides a compelling response to claims that
prohibitions on transfer render impossible the pre-petition grant of an
interest in the economic value of certain licenses, the approach is not
foolproof. Some courts have outright rejected the approach of Tracy
Broadcasting and Ridgely.119 Other courts have held that the U.C.C. 9-408
analysis cannot apply to governmental licenses that are not “property” under
state law.120 Although these cases threaten to limit the ability of a secured
creditor to achieve effective entity priority in some cases, not every debtor
relies heavily on governmental licenses or other non-assignable property. In
any event, the weight of authority appears in favor of broad pre-petition
security interests in cash-flows resulting from the sale of such licenses.
B. Contributions of Labor and Managerial Effort
For some, the logic underlying the closed system unravels when
considering the fact that assets do not create other assets without the
application of labor and other factors of production. The introduction of such
efforts into the production process renders dubious the claim that all of the
value of the enterprise is subject to the secured creditor’s pre-bankruptcy
security interest. The introduction of non-collateral requires post-petition
value to be allocated on the basis of the relative contributions of collateral
and non-collateral.121
In re Cafeteria Operators, L.P. provides an example of the problem.122
There, the debtor operated cafeteria-style restaurants and a commercial food
preparation, processing, and distribution center.123 The court was called
upon to consider whether cash that had accumulated post-petition was
subject to the secured creditor’s interest.124 The court observed that the
restaurant business is principally a service industry in which most of the
revenues are paid as a result of services provided by the debtor’s
employees.125 The inventory, in which the creditor claimed a lien,

118

Id. at 380.
See In re Tak Commc’ns, Inc., 138 B.R. 568, 577 (W.D. Wis. 1992), aff'd sub nom. Matter of
Tak Commc’ns, Inc., 985 F.2d 916, 918 (7th Cir. 1993) (declining to adopt the holding of Ridgely).
120
Chris–Don, Inc. v. United Tr. Bank (In re Chris-Don, Inc.), 367 F. Supp. 2d 696, 701 (D.N.J.
2005).
121
See In re Cafeteria Operators, L.P., 299 B.R. 400, 402 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003) (finding that,
because the use of pre-petition collateral “undoubtedly makes up part of a debtor[’s] post-petition
income, such income is, in part, the secured lender’s cash collateral”).
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Id. at 403.
125
Id. at 407–08.
119
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constituted only a portion of the total price customers pay for a meal.126
Further, the court found that the secured creditor’s interest in the fixtures
and equipment did not extend to post-petition revenues as proceeds because
those items were not consumed in the business.127 The court noted that the
services in the restaurant business comprise the bulk of the revenue and
because those services were generated by the “time and energy expended by
the Debtors’ employees,”128 they were not proceeds of the secured creditor’s
admittedly broad lien. The court was, however, willing to permit the bank to
show what portion of the post-petition cash was generated through the sale
of inventory and to claim that amount as collateral.129
The court’s analysis rested on the proposition that “[f]rom a plain
reading of section 552, revenues generated post-petition solely as a result of
the debtor’s labor are not subject to a pre-petition lender’s security
interest.”130 If the debtor had been an individual, this claim would
undeniably be true. In Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, quoted extensively by the
court in Cafeteria Operators,131 the Supreme Court struck down a wage
assignment to the extent that it sought to create a security interest in an
individual’s future wages, finding that otherwise, the debtor would be unable
to obtain the fresh start offered by bankruptcy.132 Quoting another case
involving an individual debtor, the Cafeteria Operators court stated, “[i]t is
beyond question that in enacting section 552, Congress sought to preserve
the ‘fresh start’ policy so eloquently stated by the Supreme Court in Local
Loan by requiring that only security interests in after-acquired property
‘arising from, or connected with, preexisting property’ be preserved in
bankruptcy.”133
The problem with the court’s analysis is that Cafeteria Operators was an
entity and not an individual. Local Loan focused on post-bankruptcy
services provided by the individual debtor, noting:
The power of the individual to earn a living for himself and
those dependent upon him is in the nature of a personal liberty
quite as much as, if not more than, it is a property right. To
126

Id. at 408.
Id.
128
Id.; see also Premier Golf Props., LP v. U.S. Tr. (In re Premier Golf Props., LP), 477 B.R. 767,
776 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012) (“Revenue generated post-petition solely as a result of a debtor’s labor is not
subject to a creditor’s pre-petition interest.” (quoting In re Skagit Pac. Corp., 316 B.R. 330, 336 (B.A.P.
9th Cir. 2004))).
129
In re Cafeteria Operators, 299 B.R. at 409; see also In re Delbridge, 61 B.R. 484, 490–92 (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. 1986) (explaining cash collateral and dividing the post-petition value of milk produced by
cows, which were collateral, and the debtor’s labor, which was not).
130
In re Cafeteria Operators, 299 B.R. at 405.
131
Id. at 404–05.
132
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 245 (1934).
133
In re Cafeteria Operators, 299 B.R. at 405 (quoting Smoker v. Hill & Assocs., 204 B.R. 966,
974 (N.D. Ind. 1997)).
127
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preserve its free exercise is of the utmost importance, not only
because it is a fundamental private necessity, but because it is
a matter of great public concern.134
In Cafeteria Operators, however, the rights of an individual were not at
issue, and therefore the Local Loan reasoning was inapposite. The services
were not provided by the debtor itself but, instead, by its employees—
employees who may have been paid for those services with the secured
creditor’s collateral.135 If those employees were in fact paid from the
collateral, the value contributed by those services would be no less proceeds
of collateral than would be inventory or a piece of equipment that was
purchased out of the secured creditor’s cash collateral.136
The court in In re Package Design & Supply Co. applied this reasoning
to find that the secured creditor’s interest extended to post-petition
revenue.137 The court found that there were no unencumbered assets at the
time of the petition and that there were no contributions or obligations postpetition that had not been fully satisfied.138 Thus, the court concluded, “all
of the value added by others was completely paid for by the lender’s
collateral, and only by the lender’s collateral, without reference to an afteracquired property clause.”139 The court noted, however, that this would not
be the case if there had been significant assets purchased on post-petition
credit, where there were substantial unencumbered assets that contributed
significant value to the assets, or where the secured creditor was oversecured and thus post-petition assets were purchased with equity that would
have been available to unsecured creditors.140 Thus, some courts recognize
that where the secured creditor holds a security interest in all of the assets of
the debtor at the petition date and where there is no other source for cash to
operate the business, all of the value accruing post-petition is proceeds of
the collateral.
C. Section 552(b) and the Equities of the Case Exception
Section 552(b) includes a proviso that allows a court to limit claims to
proceeds “based on the equities of the case.”141 The breadth of this equities
134

Local Loan, 292 U.S. at 245.
See ResCap, supra note 15, at 858 (providing an example of the payment model).
136
Id.
137
In re Package Design & Supply Co., 217 B.R. 422, 427 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1998). The court in
In re Package Design confronted the trustee’s claim that the secured creditor had lost its claim on cash
collateral by failing to obtain a timely cash collateral order. The trustee’s argument was that the cash
collateral existing at the time the secured creditor had filed its motion for such an order comprised funds
received post-petition, and therefore the lender’s collateral had “rolled out from underneath the lien
during the first six months of [the] case.” Id. at 423.
138
Id.
139
Id. at 426.
140
Id. at 427.
141
11 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2012).
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exception to the proceeds rule might appear to provide a bankruptcy court
with authority to limit the secured creditor’s claim simply to rebalance
control rights or distributional outcomes in favor of unsecured creditors. The
exception might be invoked to counter the proposition that one creditor
might be entitled to all of the value of the debtor in derogation of the broader
rehabilitative purposes of Chapter 11. Indeed, in one reference, the
legislative history of section 552(b) states that the equities of the case
exception “is designed, among other things, to prevent windfalls for secured
creditors and to give the courts broad discretion to balance the protection of
secured creditors, on the one hand, against the strong public policies
favoring continuation of jobs, preservation of going concern values and
rehabilitation of distressed debtors, generally.”142
Although this statement seems to grant courts a relatively broad warrant
to adjust claims to proceeds based on the needs of the debtor, other
legislative statements regarding the purpose of the exception are much more
closely circumscribed. In the House and Senate reports that accompanied the
introduction of what would become the Code, the exception was explained
in more limited terms:
[The equities of the case exception] is designed to cover the
situation where the estate expends funds that result in an
increase in the value of collateral. The exception is to cover
the situation where raw materials, for example, are converted
into inventory, or inventory into accounts, at some expense to
the estate, thus depleting the fund available for general
unsecured creditors.143
Although there are few cases considering the scope of the exception, the
courts have not indulged the temptation to use the exception as a warrant to
rebalance bankruptcy distributions. For example, most courts have held that
“the principal purpose of the equities of the case exception is to prevent
secured creditors from reaping unjust benefits from an increase in the value
of collateral during a bankruptcy case resulting from the (usually)
reorganizing chapter 11 debtor’s use of other assets of the estate or from the
investment of non-estate assets.”144
142

140 CONG. REC. H10,768 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994).
H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 377 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6332–33; see also
S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 91 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5877 (explaining the situations
in which the exception applies).
144
N.H. Bus. Dev. Corp. v. Cross Baking Co. (In re Cross Baking Co.), 818 F.2d 1027, 1033 (1st
Cir. 1987); United Va. Bank v. Slab Fork Coal Co. (In re Slab Fork Coal Co.), 784 F.2d 1188, 1191 (4th
Cir. 1986); J. Catton Farms, Inc. v. First Nat’l Bank of Chi. (In re J. Catton Farms, Inc.), 779 F.2d 1242,
1246–47 (7th Cir. 1985); Wolters Vill., Ltd. v. Vill. Props., Ltd. (In re Vill. Props., Ltd.), 723 F.2d 441,
444 (5th Cir. 1984); Arnot v. Endresen (In re Endresen), 548 B.R. 258, 274 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2016) (citing
Toso v. Bank of Stockton (In re Toso), No. B.A.P. EC–05–1290, 2007 WL 7540985, at *13 (9th Cir.
B.A.P. Jan. 10, 2007)); Marine Midland Bank v. Breeden (In re Bennett Funding Grp., Inc), 255 B.R.
143
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This application of the equities exception is best understood through the
facts of In re Delbridge. There, the debtor, an individual in Chapter 11,
challenged the claim of its secured creditor to milk produced by the debtor’s
cows (the secured creditor’s collateral) post-petition.145 The problem, of
course, was that while the milk was clearly a product of the cow, it could not
be produced without the labor of the farmer.146 Using the equities exception,
the court fashioned a remedy that allocated the cash proceeds of the milk to
the secured creditor and to the farmer based on their relative inputs.147 Put
differently, the court recognized that the milk, and the cash proceeds of the
milk, were collateral but that the equities of the case required reduction of
that collateral based on the labor and expenditures of the farmer.148
Thus, the equities exception does little that a clear understanding of the
principles of proceeds identifiability can do. Indeed, the Cafeteria Operators
court invoked the equities exception as an alternative basis to its holding that
the post-petition revenues of the business included not only the value of the
food inventory, but also the value of the labor.149 Of course, the two cases
are quite dissimilar in that the labor of the farmer was truly unencumbered
under the principles of Local Loan. In a case involving an entity, however,
the principles of Local Loan do not apply, and one must ask instead about
the source of cash used to pay for that labor. If there is no source other than
the secured creditor’s collateral, the contribution of labor or any other input
should not provide a basis to limit the secured creditor’s claim under the
equities of the case exception.
In re Laurel Hill Paper Co. provides an example. There, following a
sale of all of the debtor’s assets, the debtor sought to allocate $1,000,000 of
the sale proceeds to the unsecured creditors based on the equities of the case
exception.150 The debtor argued that the allocation reflected the increase in
value of the assets attributable to the efforts of the debtor’s Chief
Restructuring Officer (“CRO”).151 The court agreed that both the debtor and
the CRO had undertaken substantial efforts to protect the value of the assets
and eliminate uncertainties that would result in a depressed sale price, but
also noted that all of the costs of these activities were paid from funds that

616, 634 (N.D.N.Y. 2000); Great-West Life & Annuity Assurance Co. v. Parke Imperial Canton, Ltd.,
177 B.R. 843, 855 (N.D. Ohio 1994); Delbridge v. Prod. Credit Ass’n & Fed. Land Bank, 104 B.R. 824,
826 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
145
In re Delbridge, 61 B.R. 484, 486 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986).
146
Id. at 489.
147
Id. at 491.
148
Id.
149
In re Cafeteria Operators, L.P., 299 B.R. 400, 409–10 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003).
150
All Points Capital Corp. v. Laurel Hill Paper Co. (In re Laurel Hill Paper Co.), 393 B.R. 89, 91–
92 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2008).
151
Id. at 91.
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152

were subject to the secured creditor’s interests. The court therefore denied
the allocation, stating that “[p]ayments at the expense of secured creditors
rather than at the expense of the estate do not support an equities of the case
award to the unsecured creditors.”153 The case is a good example of closedsystem reasoning. Because the secured creditors claimed an interest in all of
the assets at the beginning of the case, the increases in value during the
bankruptcy process (up to the amount of the secured creditor’s claims) were
proceeds of the collateral used to generate those increases.
D. Soft Variables
Michelle Harner has observed that the value of a business entity includes
not only the value of its traditional assets—equipment, inventory and
payment intangibles—but also the value of its “soft variables.”154 These soft
variables include the traditional components of goodwill—the human capital
of a firm, its operational efficiencies and strategic decisions and plans, and
its relationships with other actors.155 In Harner’s view, because these soft
variables do not fit easily within traditional definitions of property, the
secured lender cannot claim an interest in them as original collateral. 156
Harner argues that because these soft variables are not collateral, the value
flowing from them is after-acquired property and not proceeds.157 Thus, soft
variables included in the enterprise value cannot be included within the
scope of the secured lender’s blanket lien, and at least some of the value
attributable to those variables should remain available to pay unsecured
claims.158 Harner’s argument then is that a secured creditor can never truly
obtain a lien in all of the assets of the debtor.159
If Harner is correct and a secured creditor cannot obtain an interest in
these soft variables until they have been realized, the contribution they make
to the cash flow of the debtor represents a leak in the closed system that
would defeat the secured creditor’s claim to effective entity priority. No
longer could a blanket lienholder claim that all of the value accruing post152

Id. at 93–94. Funding for the CRO’s activities was provided by post-petition financing that was
repaid from proceeds of the prepetition lender’s collateral. Id.
153
Id. at 94 (citing In re Muma Servs., Inc., 322 B.R. 541, 559 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005); Airport Inn
Assocs., Ltd. v. Travelers Ins. Co. (In re Airport Inn Assocs., Ltd.), 132 B.R. 951, 959 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1990)).
154
Harner, supra note 12, at 509.
155
Id. at 519.
156
Id. at 522, 526.
157
See id. at 532 (“[A]ny . . . interest in goodwill granted to the creditor extends only to the value
generated by soft variables once recognized . . . . [Soft] variables themselves are not collateral; therefore,
any value generated by soft variables [does] not constitute proceeds of collateral.”).
158
Id. at 527.
159
Id. at 532 (“A simple application of this principle under section 552 of the Code suggests that
neither the debtor’s soft variables nor any value generated by those variables post[-]petition are subject
to a creditor’s pre[-]petition security agreement.”).
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petition is subject to the security interest, and thus, bankruptcy distributions
would necessarily allocate some of the going concern value to general
unsecured claimants. Doing so would require some way of valuing these
variables. Harner advocates this result, reasoning that such an undertaking
would improve the bankruptcy process by giving employees and others “a
potential interest in the outcome and perhaps a seat at the negotiating
table.”160
Harner relies on traditional conceptions of property, accounting
treatment, and constitutional concerns for her conclusion that soft variables
are not property and therefore cannot become collateral until the value of
those variables is realized—that is, until they actually produce tangible value
in the form of cash flow. She notes that a company cannot control, possess
or transfer the way its people “think, behave, or perform, or the relationships
they maintain.”161 Because the company cannot own or control those assets,
and because the benefits are not measurable, soft variables cannot find their
way onto a balance sheet until they are identified in a merger or other
reorganization.162 Finally, she provides constitutional and policy arguments
respecting individual autonomy and prohibiting involuntary servitude to bar
the treatment of human capital as property of a corporation.163
It is true that a business entity cannot control its human capital in the
sense of forcing its employees to continue to work, think, or maintain
relationships in particular ways. It is, of course, also true that a business
entity cannot realize the value of its human capital through a sale of that
capital separate from the sale of the entity itself. But it does not necessarily
follow that there is nothing there against which a security interest can attach.
The company does not have a right to its employees’ labor, but it is free to
contract for that labor and those contracts—even though they are normally
at will and, even if not, cannot be specifically enforced—have value.
Similarly, the company does not have a right to the loyalty of its customers,
but the investments made by the company have created that loyalty and it
remains a valuable asset while it exists. The fact that the company does not
control the behavior of other actors does not mean that the web of
relationships the company created and maintained over the years with
employees, suppliers, customers, governmental regulators, a sympathetic
community and all of the other contributors of soft variables is not itself
property of the company—intangible property, to be sure, but nevertheless
property.

160

Id. at 534.
Id. at 522.
162
Id. at 523.
163
See id. at 534–35 (arguing that constitutional and policy considerations must be “balanced in
determining the proper treatment of soft variables in bankruptcy”).
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The fact that the value of these soft variables has not been “realized”—
in the sense that these factors have not been separately valued and placed on
the financial statements of the corporation—does not necessarily mean that
they cannot serve as collateral. Goodwill, as an accounting principle, simply
represents the difference between the price paid for a business entity and the
value of all of the measurable tangible and intangible assets of the entity.164
Because a business’s internally generated goodwill is inherently difficult to
measure, it is not included on the balance sheet until an event occurs (a
business combination or restructuring) that provides an objective basis for
such measurement. The fact that accountants do not represent goodwill on
financial statements until such objective basis is revealed does not mean that
goodwill does not exist as an asset until that time occurs. Businesspeople
understand that value exists even if accountants do not record it until after a
business combination or reorganization occurs. Our core concepts of
property and value in bankruptcy have nothing to do with accounting
treatments or other formal principles.165 Given the Code’s focus on real
economic values and interests, it seems wrong to allow accounting principles
to control.
Harner argues that the constitutional prohibition against involuntary
servitude and public policies respecting individual autonomy strongly argue
against the recognition of soft variables as property of the company and
therefore as potential collateral.166 She notes that soft variables arise from
“people and their time, talents, and efforts”—human capital that cannot be
alienated.167 While it is, of course, true that the company cannot sell its
people or their services, this observation misses the point. No one suggests
that the company can force its employees to work for the company or for an
assignee of their employment contracts. Future services are not the asset
being conveyed. Instead, the asset represented by soft variables is the
network of contracts, relationships, and perhaps even good feelings that exist
at any given point in time. That network is a result of investments by the
business in supplier, customer, and employee relationships that may, to a
greater or lesser extent, solidify and preserve those relationships. That
network is alienable through a sale of the business assets as a going concern.
164

See id. at 533 (defining a company’s goodwill as being calculated based on “the difference in
the book or liquidation value and the market value of the company”).
165
Accounting principles generally hold no sway in bankruptcy cases. For example, “[p]roperty of
the estate” under the Code is broadly defined to include “all legal or equitable interests . . . in property,”
without regard to formalities such as accounting realization. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2012). Section 506(a)
makes clear that value of collateral is a judicial determination that is not dependent on accounting
concepts. The definition of insolvency calls for assets and liabilities to be compared “at a fair valuation.”
11 U.S.C. § 101(32) (2012); see also In re Lease-A-Fleet, Inc., 155 B.R. 666, 679 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993)
(“Courts are not required to rely upon GAAP standards when determining the issue of insolvency.”).
166
Harner, supra note 12, at 534–35.
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The fact that the employee may reject a successor employer’s offer of
employment, like the right of the non-debtor to refuse to acknowledge the
assignment of a personal services contract, is beside the point. The asset is
the potential ability to sell or use the network of people and relationships.
Like non-assignable contracts and licenses,168 that ability has a value that
exists prior to the petition.
E. Collateral Valuation and Value Provided by the Bankruptcy System
Even if a secured creditor is successful in claiming a security interest in
all of the pre- and post-petition assets of a debtor, effective entity priority
requires that those assets be valued on a going concern rather than a
liquidation basis. The proper assumptions under which the bankruptcy court
should value the secured creditor’s collateral is the subject of substantial
controversy.169
Valuation under a going concern assumption is essential if the secured
creditor is to capture the entire cash flow of the business because the assetbased approach of the bankruptcy process limits priority to the value of the
collateral.170 Some, perhaps much, of the potential cash flow of the debtor is
dependent on maintaining the assets in a going concern, and a liquidation
assumption would disregard that added value by fixing the secured creditor’s
priority at the amount that the secured creditor would have received had it
foreclosed on the assets and sold them.171 The value added by keeping the
assets together, on this assumption, would be non-collateral that would
contaminate the closed system and would render the secured creditor’s
effective entity priority claim untenable.172
The question of collateral valuation is relevant at two stages in a
bankruptcy case. Throughout the case, collateral valuation sets the secured
creditor’s entitlement to adequate protection.173 During the case, the secured
creditor is entitled to have the value of its interest in the collateral

168

See supra text accompanying note 101 (discussing the treatment of non-assignable licenses or
contract rights).
169
See David Gray Carlson, Secured Creditors and the Eely Character of Bankruptcy Valuations,
41 AM. U. L. REV. 63, 77 (1991) (discussing the views of a prominent critic disagreeing with courts that
choose to utilize a going concern method of valuation).
170
See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2012) (fixing the value of a creditor’s secured claim to the value of the
underlying collateral); supra notes 20–23 and accompanying text.
171
See Carlson, supra note 169, at 75–76 (addressing the differences between liquidation and going
concern value, focusing on the low value of liquidation versus the increase in value brought by utilizing
going concern value).
172
See id. at 79 (“In the end, the choice between liquidation or going concern value is based on
whether you think that secured parties or general creditors should own the bonus that adheres to the idea
of a going concern.”).
173
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 362(d)(1), 363(e), 364(d)(1) (2012) (outlining the creditor’s rights to
adequate protection throughout the pendency of the bankruptcy case).
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maintained. At the end of the case, collateral valuation fixes the secured
party’s distributional rights under the plan confirmation standards or
distributional scheme.175
Effective entity priority usually requires that the collateral be valued
under a going concern standard at both stages. A going concern
measurement of the secured creditor’s priority at the end of the case is
essential, lest the secured creditor lose its claim to the bonus that
accompanies a going concern. But the mechanics of the bankruptcy process
also require that the secured creditor’s entitlement to adequate protection
during the case be measured on a going concern basis. Adequate protection
requires that a secured party be protected against deterioration in the value
of its collateral resulting from its use, sale, or lease, and a failure to provide
such protection is cause for lifting the automatic stay to permit
foreclosure.176 Adequate protection requires one or some combination of
interim cash payments, replacement liens in unencumbered property, or
some other protection that results in the indubitable equivalent of the secured
creditor’s interest.177 If an under-secured creditor’s claim extends to all of
the collateral, there will be no unencumbered source of funds for adequate
protection. To the extent that the secured creditor’s protected interest is
reduced to liquidation value, the value to be protected is less, and
accordingly, the ability of the debtor to retain the property, without regard
to the desires of the secured creditor, is enhanced. More importantly, if the
secured creditor’s claim is fixed at liquidation value early in the case, the
debtor might attract necessary third-party financing by pledging going
concern value that would otherwise go to the secured creditor.178 Thus, even
if a secured creditor’s distributional entitlement was based on a going
concern value, the third-party, post-petition lender would effectively prime
the pre-petition creditor’s lien.
174

See 11 U.S.C. § 361 (2012) (providing mechanisms for “adequate protection” of interest).
See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A) (setting out secured creditors’ baseline distributional
entitlements).
176
See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (2012) (allowing the court to “grant relief from the stay . . . for cause,
including the lack of adequate protection”).
177
Interim payments and replacement liens are self-explanatory. Indubitable equivalence, however,
is more difficult to explain. Abandonment of collateral may be one form of indubitable equivalence, but
that defeats the purpose of the debtor’s effort to retain the property. In re L.B. Bryant, 439 B.R. 724, 747
(Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2010). An equity cushion may also provide indubitable equivalence. In re Sugarleaf
Timber, LLC, 529 B.R. 317, 335 (M.D. Fla. 2015). Our focus here, however, is on under-secured
creditors.
178
See Suntrust Bank v. Den-Mark Constr., Inc., 406 B.R. 683, 700 (E.D.N.C. 2009) (noting that
an equity cushion may constitute adequate protection for granting a priming lien); In re Timber Prods.,
Inc., 125 B.R. 433, 436–37 n.11 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990) (collecting cases in which an equity cushion
has been found to constitute adequate protection); In re Snowshoe Co., Inc. v. Shenandoah Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass’n, 789 F.2d 1085, 1090 (4th Cir. 1986) (noting that equity cushion and independent financial
analysis are sufficient protection for the grant of a priming lien).
175
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As David Carlson has pointed out, valuation in bankruptcy is usually an
exercise in determining subjunctive facts.179 Asset value is only objectively
observed in the context of an exchange. One can tell how much something
is worth by what someone will pay for it.180 In bankruptcy, however, market
exchange is usually delayed and in some cases never happens at all. In the
absence of a real exchange, valuation requires a hypothetical exchange and
requires the court to make some assumptions about the circumstances under
which such a hypothetical exchange would occur.181 The basic question is
whether the hypothetical exchange would occur under non-bankruptcy
foreclosure rules or as an arm’s length sale of all of the debtor’s assets. This
is a substantive legal question and not a question of fact.
The Bankruptcy Code is not entirely clear regarding the appropriate
assumption a court should make when determining the value of the
collateral. Section 506(a) provides that value “shall be determined in light
of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such
property.”182 The legislative history of section 361 (providing adequate
protection) is particularly ambivalent, noting that the method of determining
the value and the timing of that determination is unspecified and stating:
These matters are left to case-by-case interpretation and
development . . . . [It is not] expected that the courts will
construe the term value to mean, in every case, forced sale
liquidation value or full going concern value. There is wide
latitude between those two extremes although forced sale
liquidation value will be a minimum.183
The Supreme Court, in Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, addressed
this question in the context of a Chapter 13 plan.184 The secured creditor held
a security interest in a truck owned by the debtor, which the debtor proposed
to satisfy by paying the amount of the allowed secured claim.185 The debtor
proposed to pay the foreclosure value of the truck while the secured creditor
claimed a right to the higher replacement value.186 The Court focused on
section 506(a)’s admonition that the value of property, for the purpose of
determining a secured claim, is to be determined in light of the proposed
179
See Carlson, supra note 169, at 70 (discussing how a bankruptcy judge must hypothesize the
historical facts to determine value).
180
See id. at 75.
181
See, e.g., Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 953 (1997) (deciding between a
replacement-value standard and a foreclosure-value standard for the appropriate valuation); In re
Heritage Highgate, Inc., 679 F.3d. 132, 141 (3d Cir. 2012) (observing Congressional intent to give courts
flexibility when determining the standard of valuation most appropriate on a case-by-case basis).
182
11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2012).
183
S. REP. No. 95-989, at 54 (1978).
184
Rash, 520 U.S. at 953.
185
Id.
186
Id.
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187

disposition or use of the collateral.
That language, the court held,
contemplates a valuation assumption that tracks the debtor’s actual use of
the collateral, rather than an assumption that contemplates a purely
hypothetical foreclosure by the secured creditor.188
The court in ResCap applied the Supreme Court’s reasoning in the
context of a Chapter 11 dispute regarding adequate protection.189 There, a
secured creditor sought a priority claim based on the diminution in value of
its collateral over the course of the case.190 The unsecured creditors’
committee argued that there was no diminution in value because the secured
creditor’s claim should be “valued at the Petition Date” under a foreclosure
standard.191 The District Court rejected that argument, noting that the parties
had never contemplated a liquidation of the collateral by a foreclosure
sale.192 In addition, the court held that “the proper valuation methodology
must account for the proposed disposition of the collateral.”193 Because the
parties had intended to conduct a going concern sale on the date of the
petition, the court adopted that state as its valuation assumption.194
The result was not, however, a complete victory for the secured
creditor—merely adopting a going concern assumption says nothing about
the rest of the facts surrounding the sale. The timing of the hypothetical sale
and the condition of the debtor at that time was critical to the court’s
analysis.195 The question presented by the adequate protection dispute was
the value of the assets on the petition date. The secured parties’ expert valued
the collateral on that date by taking the sale price obtained in the bankruptcy
187
See id. at 962 (“As we comprehend § 506(a), the ‘proposed disposition or use’ of the collateral
is of paramount importance to the valuation question.”).
188
See id. (“Applying a foreclosure-value standard when the cram down option is invoked attributes
no significance to the different consequences of the debtor's choice to surrender the property or retain it.
A replacement-value standard, on the other hand, distinguishes retention from surrender and renders
meaningful the key words ‘disposition or use.’”).
189
Residential Capital, LLC v. UMB Bank, N.A. (In re Residential Capital) (ResCap), 501 B.R.
549, 550 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013).
190
Id. at 556.
191
Id. at 591.
192
Id. at 593.
193
Id. at 594; see also id. at 593–94 n.32 (citing cases adopting the going concern valuation
assumption). But see id. at 594 n.33 (citing cases adopting a foreclosure assumption). The use of going
concern or replacement value does not always result in a higher value, however. The Ninth Circuit
adopted the rationale of Rash in a case in which a foreclosure sale would have resulted in a higher value
because the foreclosure would have eliminated a deed restriction that limited the debtor’s use of the
property as affordable housing. Because the debtor proposed to retain the property subject to the
restriction, the court, following Rash, applied the lower value. In re Sunnyslope Hous. Ltd. P’ship, 859
F.3d 637, 644 (9th Cir. 2017).
194
ResCap, 501 B.R. at 595–96. Although the secured creditor succeeded in persuading the court
to adopt its valuation assumption, it ultimately failed to carry its burden of proving that the value of the
collateral had deteriorated during the case. Id.
195
See id. at 619 (explaining that the burden is on the plaintiff to prove that the defendants were not
over-secured, and how the plaintiff’s expert’s calculations did not necessarily meet this burden).
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auction of the collateral and discounting it back to the petition date by
adjusting for transactions occurring during the case.196 This analysis ignored
the fact that the pre-petition debtor would have had a significantly more
difficult time obtaining required consents for sale, and that a sale by an
insolvent pre-bankruptcy debtor would have resulted in substantially less
proceeds than could be obtained through the bankruptcy process. The court
stated:
[E]ven if the Court accepts that the assets were saleable on the
Petition Date—before all of the work conducted during the
bankruptcy necessary to make them saleable—the [secured
creditors’ expert’s] valuation cannot be relied upon because it
provides a fair market value of the assets in the hands of a
solvent company. Most of the assets could not simply be
turned over to a buyer who could instantly reap full value as if
the assets were commodity products . . . . The [secured
creditors’ experts’] valuation ignores the reality of the period
leading up to this bankruptcy: ResCap was an insolvent
company, over-burdened with debt, owning assets that had to
be “fixed” before they were sold, and facing a real possibility
of being shut down.197
ResCap makes clear that valuation not only requires an understanding
of the planned use or disposition of collateral, but must also account for the
circumstances existing at the time of the valuation.198 Although the valuation
issue arose late in the case, after the debtor had taken advantage of the
bankruptcy process to fix problems with the assets, the court measured the
secured party’s right to adequate protection by the value of the assets at the
time of the bankruptcy petition.199 Put differently, at the outset of the case,
the secured creditor’s claim does not extend to benefits provided by the
bankruptcy process itself.
Ted Janger has made a similar point relying on the creditor’s bargain
theory of bankruptcy law.200 This widely accepted theory was developed by

196

Id. at 603–04.
Id. at 596.
198
See Ralph Brubaker, The Post-RadLAX Ghosts of Pacific Lumber and Philly News (Part 1): Is
Reorganization Surplus Subject to a Secured Creditor’s Pre-Petition Lien?, 34 BANKR. L. LETTER, no.
6, June 2014, at 1–2 (“Judge Glenn . . . further refined the appropriate subjunctive scenario for that
petition-date valuation by examining what kind of sale the debtor could have (in our counter-factual
hypothetical-sale valuation universe) actually effectuated on the petition date.”).
199
See ResCap, 501 B.R. at 617 (reducing JSN’s collateral by the amount of cash in the “Avoidable
Deposit Accounts as of the Petition Date”).
200
Logic and Limits, supra note 12, at 589; see also Tracing Equity, supra note 13, at 706–08
(presenting Janger’s perspective on the secured creditor’s entitlement of disposition of collateral under
Chapter 11).
197
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201

Thomas Jackson over thirty years ago, and later refined by Jackson and
Douglas Baird.202 The theory views bankruptcy as a solution to a collective
action problem created by inefficient state law debt collection remedies.203
Because state law remedies rely on a first-in-time distribution scheme, these
remedies promote a destructive race to the courthouse and a destruction of
value due to the uncoordinated and rule-bound nature of that race.204
Bankruptcy replaces these remedies with a collective proceeding that is
better designed to maximize the value of the assets. Providing the conditions
for a collective proceeding is the sole purpose of business bankruptcy cases,
and in the view of Jackson and Baird, bankruptcy provisions should depart
from non-bankruptcy entitlements only to the extent necessary to promote
this collectivization.205 A reshuffling of priorities inside of bankruptcy that
is not necessary to promote the collective nature of the proceeding simply
introduces forum shopping and is an overall inefficient use of the bankruptcy
process.206
The creditors’ bargain theory has long been invoked to protect secured
creditors from an erosion of their position in bankruptcy cases. Janger argues
that, paradoxically, the net effect of the purported preservation of secured
creditor rights has been to enhance their recoveries far beyond those
available outside of bankruptcy, effectively turning the creditors’ bargain on
its head.207 Janger’s central point is that bankruptcy law should take
seriously the notion that the bankruptcy system should enforce nonbankruptcy entitlements, and that the secured creditor’s entitlement under
non-bankruptcy law is to conduct a foreclosure.208 This would require that
the secured creditor’s claim both for adequate protection and a distributional
priority should be valued under a foreclosure standard determined at the
outset of the case.209
As the facts of ResCap demonstrate, it seems clear that in many cases,
the bankruptcy sale process provides significant advantages over nonbankruptcy sales by distressed businesses, particularly over foreclosure sales
conducted by a secured creditor. Chapter 11 bankruptcy allows for
201
Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain, 91
YALE L.J. 857, 857–58 (1982); Logic and Limits, supra note 12, at 591.
202
See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganization and the Treatment of
Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on the Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in
Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 97 (1984) (developing the creditors’ bargain model).
203
See Jackson, supra note 201, at 859–60 (proposing bankruptcy as a system to effectuate the
“creditors’ bargain”).
204
See id. at 866 (comparing collective remedies to an individualized remedies system).
205
Id. at 872.
206
See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to
Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815, 824 (1987) (addressing the costs of forum shopping).
207
Logic and Limits, supra note 12, at 591.
208
Id. at 602.
209
Id.
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coordination of asset sales allowing, for example, the sale of realty and
related personal property at a single time and to a single buyer.210 It
eliminates, or at least limits, the ability of the debtor to interfere with sales,
permits sales free and clear of property interests, and allows the trustee or
debtor in possession, with the oversight of the court, to determine the best
time and manner of conducting the sale.211 In Chapter 11, these benefits are
magnified because the process contemplates a stabilization of the entire
business, retention of management, and a process that is more conducive to
the sale of the entire business as a going concern.
Permitting a secured creditor—even one with a security interest in all of
the debtor’s assets—to claim the entire going concern value would
effectively extend that creditor’s priority interest to that portion of the
surplus generated by the bankruptcy process itself. This “bankruptcy-created
value,”212 unlike the surplus resulting from Harner’s soft variables, does not
arise from the debtor’s assets. It is instead generated by an efficient legal
system and thus the distribution of this surplus appears to be up for grabs.213
In this sense, the point is another iteration of the scope question that is
considered in this section. The decision to use a foreclosure assumption in
valuing collateral is not so much a question of determining value; it is instead
a question of who should benefit from the collective nature of the bankruptcy
process. Janger’s view would limit the scope of the secured creditor’s
security interest and permit a distribution of all or some portion of this
bankruptcy-created value to unsecured or subordinated claimants. The end
result would be to eliminate effective entity priority and to require the
enterprise value to be allocated on an asset priority basis with the court fixing
the secured creditor’s priority claim at the amount that the secured creditor
would have received on liquidation and allocating the bankruptcy-created
value to the unsecured creditors.
Although there is considerable logical force in Janger’s argument, it
assumes that there is a substantial, measurable bankruptcy surplus. Baird has
argued that “the distinction between values realized in bankruptcy and out
is overdrawn.”214 He notes that going concern sales are possible outside of
bankruptcy through receiverships and assignments for the benefit of
creditors.215 In any event, even if the bankruptcy process creates value
210

See id. at 603 (“Two adjoining pieces of real property may be worth more sold together than
separately. A building sold with everything in it, as well as all the tenants may be worth more than the
same building sold empty (or vice versa).”).
211
See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2012) (outlining provisions in which a trustee may sell property “free
and clear of any interest”).
212
Logic and Limits, supra note 12, at 615.
213
See id. (“Secured creditors ‘own’ what they own outside of bankruptcy. If they get more through
bankruptcy, either because the statute allocates value to them, or because of bankruptcy-created value,
that is a gift, not property they are entitled to as a matter of right.”).
214
ResCap, supra note 15, at 853.
215
Id.
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through introducing efficiencies, that fact is not itself an argument for any
particular allocation of that value. If foreclosure is the baseline, it is the
baseline for all of the parties—not just the secured creditor. A foreclosure
would eliminate going concern surplus for the secured creditors and
unsecured creditors alike and may eliminate any chance that a more efficient
process might result in a value sufficient to provide a distribution to
unsecured creditors.
The secured and unsecured creditors’ bargain, then, might logically
apply to the surplus created by the bankruptcy process. On this view, the
secured creditors’ priority should extend to the value achievable through the
most efficient realization process. To the extent that bankruptcy provides
such a process, its use should be encouraged on an allocative efficiency basis
notwithstanding the fact that the process benefits one group of creditors
rather than another.216 Thus, the mere fact that Congress has provided such
a process is not alone a basis for allocating some or all of the benefits of that
process to the unsecured creditors. Janger’s view that the value of the
secured creditor’s priority claim should be fixed at a hypothetical
foreclosure that not only has not happened, but also that no one wants to
happen, seems an artificial way to force such a distributive result.217
IV. EFFECTIVE ENTITY PRIORITY AND THE BANKRUPTCY PROCESS
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, effective entity priority rests on
a fragile footing, requiring the establishment of a closed system that begins
and ends with all of the elements of the debtor’s value deriving from the
secured creditor’s collateral. Both in theory and practice, the maintenance of
such a closed system is difficult, and leaks in the system through noncollateral contributions often occur. Nevertheless, claims of blanket lien
creditors to all of the value persist, and only rarely does the case law directly
confront the question.
This should come as no surprise. The basic structure of the Bankruptcy
Code has been in place for nearly forty years, over which time much has
changed in the world of commercial finance. In 1979, when the Code
became effective, secured debt was principally asset-based.218 The
Bankruptcy Code and the U.C.C. were not designed with anything like
216

See id. at 853–54 (“[I]f a rule were put in place to provide the senior creditor only with the value
of what it could have reached outside of bankruptcy, it could either avoid bankruptcy or take steps (such
as changing the capital structure or lending less in the first instance) to ensure that its non-bankruptcy
alternative was more promising or was sufficient to pay it in full.”).
217
See id. at 854 (“Given the difficulties of using other benchmarks, the party who argues in favor
of valuing the secured creditor’s right by some hypothetical disposition that never happened should bear
the burden of explaining to the court why taking everyone down such a rabbit hole makes sense.”).
218
Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 943–44
(1986).
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effective entity priority in mind—as previously discussed, such an idea was
spawned instead by industry practices that employed an expansive cash-flow
theory of secured lending. Although the 2001 amendments to the U.C.C.
made possible much broader security interests (making effective entity
priority arguments stronger), the Code was not changed to accommodate the
sort of arguments blanket lienholders make.219 Thus, the basic legal
arguments in favor of effective entity priority have a jury-rigged feel that
creates substantial uncertainty.220
One reason for this continuing uncertainty is that arguments for and
against effective entity priority are often not made directly, but instead
underlie and are obscured by other questions that arise in bankruptcy cases.
The right of a secured creditor to credit bid its claim in a going concern sale,
a right affirmed by the Supreme Court in RadLAX,221 provides one example.
RadLAX considered the question of whether a plan of reorganization could
propose a sale of collateral without providing the secured creditor a right to
credit bid its claim. The plan proposed an auction without credit bidding and
a judicial valuation of the secured creditor’s collateral.222 The plan was
proposed as a cramdown, to be confirmed despite the secured creditor’s
objection, and its confirmability was based on the claim that a judicial
valuation of the secured creditor’s claim and payment of that amount from
the proceeds of the sale would provide the secured creditor the “indubitable
equivalent” of its secured claims.223 The Supreme Court held that a sale
without credit bidding could not satisfy the indubitable equivalence basis for
confirmation because such a sale would be in direct violation of an
alternative basis—a sale that contemplated credit bidding.224
The RadLAX opinion confined its analysis of the question to statutory
interpretation and, at first blush, the controversy seems to be about little
more than Chapter 11 strategy and bidding processes.225 But, as Ralph
Brubaker has demonstrated, the credit bidding question raises concerns
219
See Bankrupt Proceeds Rule, supra note 12, at 534–553 (arguing that bankruptcy courts should
interpret proceeds narrowly under bankruptcy law rather than adopt the broadened U.C.C. definition).
220
See David A. Skeel, Jr., Rediscovering Corporate Governance in Bankruptcy, 87 TEMP. L. REV.
1015, 1028 (2015) (noting that several commentators have described the questions presented here as
involving the most important and hotly debated issues in current bankruptcy practice).
221
RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank (RadLAX), 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2073 (2012).
222
Id. at 2069.
223
Id. at 2070; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2012) (establishing that for a plan to be fair
and equitable, it must provide for the realization of the “indubitable equivalent of such claims”).
224
RadLAX, 132 S. Ct. at 2073. The Code provides three alternative routes to confirmation in a
cramdown plan. The basic alternatives are that the debtor retain the collateral, granting the secured
creditor deferred cash payments equal to the value of its claim, or that the collateral be sold, granting the
secured creditor a right to credit bid its claim. Indubitable equivalence is a third option. 11 U.S.C. §
1129(b)(2)(A).
225
See RadLAX, 132 S. Ct. at 2070–73 (discussing the “general/specific” canon of statutory
interpretation).
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regarding the right of a secured creditor to realize the going concern value
of all of its collateral to the exclusion of unsecured creditors or, as this article
has framed it, effective entity priority.226 Credit bidding works by permitting
the secured creditor to use its claim, rather than cash, to purchase its
collateral at a foreclosure sale. The sale price thus determines the value of
the collateral and the amount of the allowed secured claim. In RadLAX and
the principal cases preceding it,227 all of the assets of the debtor were sold as
a going concern and the under-secured creditors claimed a security interest
in the entirety of the going concern. A credit bid, under these circumstances,
would allow the secured creditor to acquire all of the enterprise value of the
debtor in satisfaction of its claim. Substituting this right with a right to
payment of a judicially determined value would only benefit junior creditors
if the judicially determined value were lower than the full enterprise value
of the debtor. In such a circumstance, the difference between the two would
be available for distribution to the unsecured creditors.228 While several
commentators have noted this feature of the credit bidding controversy,229
neither RadLAX nor the preceding cases directly addressed the question.
The question is also frequently subsumed in negotiations regarding
debtor in possession (“DIP”) financing. A debtor with a secured creditor
holding blanket liens in all of its assets is usually at the mercy of that secured
creditor to provide financing throughout the case. The ease with which the
secured creditor can obtain and maintain an interest in all of the cash of the
debtor creates an immediate need for financing (or permission to use cash
collateral), and the secured creditor can exploit that need to enhance its claim
through a roll-up of its pre-petition debt230 and through other control
provisions.231 The scope of the secured creditor’s claim is an important
226
Ralph Brubaker, Credit Bidding and the Secured Creditor's Baseline Distributional Entitlement
in Chapter 11, 32 BANKR. L. LETTER, no. 7, July 2012, at 11–12; Brubaker, supra note 198, at 1–2.
227
In re Pac. Lumber Co., 584 F.3d 229, 236–37 (5th Cir. 2009); In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC,
599 F.3d 298, 298, 301 (3d Cir. 2010).
228
Brubaker notes that both the Philadelphia Newspapers and RadLAX plans contemplated
payments to unsecured creditors—payments that would violate the absolute priority rule if the secured
creditor’s claim extended to the debtors’ entire enterprise value. See generally Brubaker, supra note 226,
at 12–13; Brubaker, supra note 198, at 1–2.
229
See Logic and Limits, supra note 12, at 613 (noting the problems created by RadLAX where the
secured creditors’ liens do not extend to all of the collateral); Barry E. Adler, Priority in Going-Concern
Surplus, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 811, 816 (noting that failure to allocate all of the going concern surplus to
secured creditors would limit the secured creditor’s ability to credit bid).
230
A “roll-up” is a financing provision that converts pre-petition debt into post-petition debt that is
secured by both pre- and post-petition assets. Such a provision obviates the need to rely on a proceeds
analysis. Paul H. Zumbro, DIP and Exit Financing Trends and Strategies in a Changing Market Place,
in RECENT TRENDS IN DEBTOR-IN-POSSESSION FINANCING: LEADING LAWYERS ANALYZE
BANKRUPTCY FINANCING 3, 12 (Aspatore 2016).
231
Various control provisions common in post-petition financing agreements are detailed in Circuit
City Unplugged: Why Did Chapter 11 Fail to Save 34,000 Jobs?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Commercial and Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 13–14 (2009)
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component of these negotiations. If the secured creditor is limited to assetbased priority—and particularly if that priority is based on foreclosure
value—the court may permit the debtor to obtain third-party financing based
on the higher reorganization value of the assets. Such third-party financing
might have the effect of priming the secured creditor’s claim to the
enterprise value. 232 The debtor, on the other hand, risks a complete loss of
control over the course of the Chapter 11 by an early finding that the secured
creditor has a claim to the entire entity.233 The result of these competing risks
is often a compromise that simply gets baked into the remainder of the case.
So much of the bankruptcy process is based on early negotiations
conducted with an incomplete understanding of the facts that the legal
questions can become somewhat obscured. The system survives this
incomplete understanding, however, through a compromise. Frequently,
such a compromise takes the form of a carve-out in which the secured
creditor permits the use of a specified amount of collateral to fund the costs
of administrative and secured claims.234 Thus, the bankruptcy system can
accommodate some uncertainty regarding the precise scope of the secured
claim in many cases.
For some, this ability to accommodate uncertainty is a feature and not a
bug. The incorporation of broad standards that produce uncertainty allow
participants in the process, including the bankruptcy judge, room to fashion
well-tailored and creative solutions to the myriad problems financial distress
raises. The debate over precision versus flexibility is a long running one235
that is unlikely to be resolved here. Suffice to say it is my general position
that uncertainty in commercial law is something to be avoided. Facts are
messy enough, even under clear rules, and satisfactory solutions are most
likely achieved when the participants are consulting the same rule book.
The fact that the system muddles through on an incomplete
understanding of the basic entitlements of the secured and unsecured
creditors does not mean that the answer is unimportant, however. Certainly,
all of the complex issues that arise in a bankruptcy case could be resolved
(testimony of Harvey R. Miller, Senior Partner, Weil, Gotshal, & Manges, LLP),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg47924/pdf/CHRG-111hhrg47924.pdf.
232
See LOAN SYNDICATION & TRADING ASS’N, THE TROUBLE WITH UNNEEDED BANKRUPTCY
REFORM: THE LSTA’S RESPONSE TO THE ABI CHAPTER 11 COMMISSION REPORT 40 (2015) [hereinafter
LSTA RESPONSE], https://www.lsta.org/uploads/DocumentModel/1860/file/lsta-abi-10615-final.pdf.
233
Id. (discussing the control of undersecured creditors).
234
See Charles W. Mooney Jr., The (Il)Legitimacy of Bankruptcies for the Benefit of Secured
Creditors, 2015 ILL. L. REV. 735, 750 (2015) (discussing carve-outs).
235
Compare Ted Janger, Crystals and Mud in Bankruptcy Law: Judicial Competence and Statutory
Design, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 559, 559 (2001) (arguing that the advocates of statutory precision
misunderstand and fail to appreciate the benefits of flexibility in bankruptcy), with Christopher W. Frost,
Bankruptcy Redistributive Policies and the Limits of the Judicial Process, 74 N.C. L. REV. 75, 126–129
(1995) (arguing that the institutional structure of the bankruptcy courts render them incapable of flexibly
redistributing the costs of financial distress).
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more efficiently if everyone started with a shared understanding of the
secured creditors’ entitlements. In fact, the issue is so fundamental that the
most recent large-scale study of the Chapter 11 process, conducted under the
auspices of the American Bankruptcy Institute, focused intensely on the
effect of secured credit on the bankruptcy process.236 Front and center in that
discussion was the question of cash flow lending using effective entity
priority and the desire of those secured lenders to amend the Code to better
support cash flow lending.237 The Commercial Finance Association and the
Loan Syndications and Trading Association238 provided extensive testimony
to the Commission in an effort to assure secured creditors’ full priority and
recommended changes that would recognize the right of cash flow lenders
to a broad priority in post-bankruptcy property. The conclusions of the
Commission clearly disappointed the secured lending community on several
fronts.
Although the Commission’s report called for secured creditors’
distributional rights to be measured by a going concern valuation of their
collateral at the end of the case, the report also recommended steps that
would limit the scope of the collateral securing that claim. The Commission
recommended that adequate protection be based on the foreclosure value of
collateral,239 a valuation standard which exposes the secured creditor’s
ultimate right to going concern value to priming by third-party financiers.240
Another recommendation was that the “equities of the case” exception in
section 552(b) be expanded to provide broader limits on the right of a
secured creditor to claim post-petition assets as proceeds.241 Specifically, the
Commission recommended that the exception could be satisfied without a
showing of specific contributions of money or unencumbered property, but
instead that the secured creditor’s right to proceeds could be limited on any
showing of the estate’s contribution of value—“whether through time, effort,
money, property, other resources, or cost savings.”242 The expansion of the
236

ABI COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 2–3.
See id. at 71 n.283 (discussing Commercial Finance Association’s recommendations regarding
cash flow lending including the recommendation that adequate protection rights be determined by using
going concern value).
238
The LSTA provided a critical response to the Commission Report. See LSTA RESPONSE, supra
note 232, at 7, 39, 46.
239
See ABI COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 67–73 (discussing that the amount of adequate
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equities exception threatens the secured creditor’s claim to effective entity
priority by envisioning the bankruptcy process itself as providing a source
for increased value that does not fall within the scope of identifiable
proceeds.243
V. A PRELIMINARY CASE FOR FULL ENTITY PRIORITY
Although the Commission Report has not resulted in Congressional
action, the extensive discussions and commentary leading to the report lay
bare the controversy over the extent of secured creditors’ priority.
Arguments over entity-based versus asset-based conceptions of secured
credit will likely continue to plague bankruptcy reorganizations until law
reform tilts the playing field in one direction or the other. Relatively small
changes, like those proposed by the Commission or the secured lending
community, might provide some incremental clarity. But it is also possible
to imagine wholesale changes that might push secured credit in one direction
or the other.
One could imagine either a return of secured credit to its asset-based
roots, or a complete capitulation to the desires of the secured lending
community for entity priority. As Jacoby, Janger, and others have suggested,
secured creditors’ claims might be limited to the liquidation value of their
collateral and security interests where proceeds are limited to those that can
be strictly tied to pre-petition collateral through some form of direct
transactional link. In the alternative, commercial and bankruptcy law might
fully embrace entity priority by making it possible for creditors to take full
priority in the entity itself. Either path presents difficulties in balancing the
cost and availability of capital with the desire to benefit junior creditors who
are unable to negotiate for a preferred position.
Consider a change that would fully embrace entity priority by granting
secured creditors a broad interest in the entity itself and therefore in the cash
flows of the entity. It is not self-evident that a priority system that blends
asset-based and entity-based priorities is superior to one that simply
allocates priority to the entire value of the entity. Indeed, secured credit
aside, distribution and control of the debtor is determined on an entity
priority basis. The basic rules governing distribution to investors other than
secured creditors call first for the distribution of value to pay the expenses
of administration.244 Distribution then goes to a small group of favored
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See LSTA RESPONSE, supra note 232, at 46–47 (“The practical result of this proposal is that a
significant portion of increases in the value of the secured creditor’s collateral during the bankruptcy case
will go to the debtor’s estate and the junior stakeholders, not to the secured creditor, even where those
increases are not the result of expending unencumbered assets that would have otherwise been available
to unsecured creditors”).
244
11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1) – (2) (2012).
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creditors, and to unsecured creditors. Finally, distribution goes to the
debtor for the benefit of equity holders, who are also organized on an entity
priority basis.246 The evolution of secured lending from simple asset-based
finance to full cash flow lending might be something to be embraced and
facilitated, rather than forced into the ill-fitting doctrinal structure described
here. There are some reasons why such a change might prove beneficial.
Such a move to full entity priority might streamline the bankruptcy
process by eliminating fights over asset values and permitting a single
enterprise valuation to set a baseline for control and distributional rights.
Control over the assets could be allocated on the basis of priority, and
decisions regarding financing, asset sales, replacement of management,
closure or enhancement of facilities, and other decisions about the future of
the business could be made by the class of creditors who stand to gain or
lose from those decisions. Full entity-based priority would make swift and
certain the shift in ownership and control over assets that theoretically form
the basis of the bankruptcy process.
For many, such a view is heretical when considering the distributional
consequences that accompany secured credit. Naturally, any move that
increases one creditor’s recovery necessarily impacts all of the other
creditors. Thus, a move to entity-based priority that enhances a secured
creditor’s recovery will come at the cost of distributions to other, more
vulnerable and perhaps more sympathetic or deserving claimants.
Entity-based priority would have its greatest impact on unsecured, noninstitutional creditors—the very group of creditors most affected by the
presence of secured credit under the present system. As a number of
commentators have observed, the risk of the business enterprise should
normally be unaffected by the way in which that risk is distributed among
the creditors and shareholders. A priority that reduces the risk of one class
of creditors should normally be offset by a corresponding increase in the risk
of other, non-favored classes.247 The problem, then, is to explain why the
granting of priority adds value. Otherwise, a system that provides a priority
might only be explained by the fact that it permits wealth transfers by
allowing the firm and the secured creditor to externalize the risk of the
business onto claimants who are unable to demand a return sufficient to
compensate them for the added risk. Certainly, non-consensual creditors
such as tort or governmental claimants are not compensated for the added
risk priority claims place on them. But even consensual creditors may see
245
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their uncompensated risk increased by priority claims. Small vendors,
employees, and the like lack the ability to negotiate for priority themselves
and may be unable to adjust their contracts to compensate for the risk that
secured credit imposes on them.248
Uncertainty over the scope of secured creditors’ claims provides
bargaining leverage that unsecured creditors use to extract distributions—
frequently in the form of a carve out from the secured creditor’s collateral.249
Thus, doubt over the scope of secured creditor’s claims accomplishes
distributional goals.
Doubtless, unsecured creditors do benefit from rules that limit secured
creditors’ claims.250 Again, some view the achievement of those benefits to
be an advantage of uncertainty.251 It is less clear, however, that any increased
distributions from uncertainty bear any relationship to the unsecured
creditors’ needs or expectations, or any other criteria for such a distribution.
For example, one may judge the contributions of trade creditors to the value
of a debtor worthy of a distribution of a particular amount or a particular
portion of their claims. Whether that creditor group obtains such a
distribution is dependent not on the application of any particular criterion,
but instead on the strength of the secured creditor’s claim and the negotiating
leverage that that strength provides. Adding uncertainty and complexity to
the bankruptcy process seems like a particularly bad way to vindicate such
claims. A streamlined process––one that eliminates the difficult value
allocation questions that asset-based priority requires––might provide a way
to address directly the claims of various stakeholders to distributions.
Simply creating a system of entity priority for senior claimants says
nothing about which claimants should occupy the senior class. A system of
entity priority must elevate all of the expenses of administering the
bankruptcy over the claims of all creditors.252 Currently, the bankruptcy
system is thought to operate for the primary benefit of unsecured creditors.253
Therefore, the expenses of administration take priority over the entity
priority accorded the unsecured creditors. Unless the trustee or debtor in
possession can show that the estate expended funds that directly benefitted
248

See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims
in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 882–91 (1996) (discussing various types of “non-adjusting” creditors,
such as private involuntary creditors, government tax and regulatory claims, voluntary creditors with
small claims, and prior voluntary creditors).
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See Mooney, Jr., supra note 234 (discussing carve-outs for administrative expenses and to fund
distributions to junior creditors).
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See id. at 750 51 (describing how secured creditors may carveout from proceeds of a sale to
“cover professional fees and other administrative expenses” and to fund distributions “for the benefit of
general unsecured creditors”).
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See discussion supra Part IV.
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Cf. Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 248, at 862 63 (noting that the principle under current law of
giving priority to secured creditors versus administrative expenses is “firmly established in the law”).
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See supra Introduction.
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the secured creditor, the secured claims are paid before administrative
expenses. Entity priority would mean that any amounts expended in the
bankruptcy proceeding would benefit the entity itself, and therefore all of
the claimants. Thus, administrative claims should occupy the first priority.
Entity priority would also provide an opportunity to address directly
distributions to various classes of prebankruptcy creditors. Commentators
generally agree that tort and other involuntary claimants should receive
priority over voluntary creditors, including secured creditors.255 Such
priority should also be accorded in an entity priority to assure that contract
claimants do not externalize the cost and risk of the business operations to
those who are not parties to the bargain. Despite the arguments in favor of
this priority, our current system leaves these involuntary claimants
subordinate to the interests of the secured creditors.256 Granting involuntary
claimants an entity priority would provide an effective way to accomplish
this change.
Priorities for voluntary but vulnerable claimants might also be
accomplished. Employee and vendor priorities might be instituted to allow
a direct and predictable method by which distributions to these creditors
might be provided. Carve-outs for preferred claims have off-and-on been a
feature of the insolvency laws of the United Kingdom.257 The carve-outs
have historically applied to floating charges—the U.K.’s version of security
interests that provide for interests in accounts, inventory, and other collateral
that is subject to a constant turnover and that provide the floating charge
lender a high degree of control over the insolvency process.258 The U.K.’s
experience with carve-outs has not been a complete success, however, owing
to the fact that they could be defeated by asset-based priority provided by a
fixed charge, and that secured lenders were able to manipulate their lending
structure to defeat the claims.259 In part, however, the problems that the U.K.
has experienced appear to be very similar to the types of difficulties that our
own asset- and entity-based systems create.260 The difficulties that the U.K.
has had in making carve-outs effective may largely be due to the design of
the system, and those difficulties may not be insurmountable.
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Of course, no system of priority will completely and perfectly protect
the interests of various creditor constituencies from the losses occasioned by
financial failure. But a priority system that is tied to entity itself might
provide more certain outcomes than one that relies on a mix of asset-based
and entity-based priorities. In all likelihood, such a system would be
preferable to the present one in which carve-outs from the secured creditor’s
priority are based on negotiating leverage that results from legal uncertainty.
Entity priority could also have an effect on the administration of
bankruptcy cases. As is the case with the distributional consequences
outlined above, the effect on the bankruptcy process requires a cautious
approach. Entity priority would eliminate costly battles over the allocation
of value that are a feature of asset-based priority but would not eliminate the
need for a process to deal with the significant control issues that bankruptcy
raises. Fortunately, the bankruptcy process has at least the theoretical
capability to allocate control rights efficiently even in an entity-based
priority system.
The allocation of control rights is an important question for any
insolvency system. Ideally, the bankruptcy process should allocate control
over the use of the business assets to the group of claimants who have the
best incentive to maximize the value of those assets. The holders of the
fulcrum security—the claimants who stand to gain or lose from marginal
decisions about the use of the assets—thus should have the ability to
influence decisions regarding those assets. Our governance systems
generally recognize this principle. In solvent businesses, control rights are
allocated to shareholders. In the bankruptcy of an insolvent business, control
generally shifts to the unsecured creditors, or to some class of under-secured
creditors depending on the value of the assets and the amount of the secured
claims.261 In this way, the system generally seeks to locate decision-making
authority in the class of claimants who are in the best position to evaluate
investment decisions. If the system fails and instead grants control rights to
out-of-the-money claimants, the choice will lead to problems of
overinvestment that manifest in prolonged reorganizations and increased
risk. At the same time, if the system grants control rights to claimants who
are assured of full payment—for example, the over-secured creditor—
decisions will result in underinvestment and potential “fire-sales” of
bankruptcy assets.262
Commentators have long noted that the control rights broad based
security interests grant to creditors creates a risk of fire-sales—or worse, a

261
See Tracing Equity, supra note 13, at 715 (discussing how creditors assert control rights in the
bankruptcy process).
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See Ice Cube Bonds, supra note 10, at 901 (“An over[-]secured creditor that would like to exit
the case quickly may be indifferent to maximizing value beyond its own payment.”).
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threat of actual misappropriation of value. Jay Westbrook, for example,
has noted that a sale by a dominant secured creditor creates a “free-rider
problem” in which the secured creditor lacks any incentive to realize more
than the amount it is owed because any excess would have to be distributed
to others.264 He further observed that the right of a secured creditor to creditbid creates the possibility that secured creditors could bid in its debt in a
poorly designed sale process and buy the assets at a substantial discount,
profiting from its control at the expense of lower priority claimants. 265
Jacoby and Janger have made similar observations, noting that blanket liens
and credit bidding might defeat protections, such as the merger and true sale
doctrines, which prevent secured creditors from squeezing out junior
creditors whose interests might be “in the money.”266
These incentive problems are largely independent of the type of priority
structure (entity based or asset based) the system adopts. Any hierarchical
priority structure requires some method of allocating control rights and
creates a risk that control will be misallocated. Dismantling secured credit
might have some effect on reducing the problem of underinvestment and
fire-sales but might create the opposite effect—overinvestment and
prolonged reorganizations. At the same time, strengthening secured credit
by providing for entity-based priority does not eliminate the need for a
judicial process to prevent fire-sales and, even worse, expropriation by fully
secured creditors of value belonging to junior claimants. Entity priority (or
at least the presence of a dominant secured creditor) is a necessary
component of proposed contract-based bankruptcy systems that eschew
judicial procedures for bankruptcy bargains based on ex-ante contracts.267 It
does not follow, however, that entity-based priority requires such a system.
Thus, adoption of entity priority does not eliminate the problem of allocating
control—if anything it highlights it in a way that it might be directly handled.
The adoption of a clear priority scheme might therefore be preferable to the
existing scheme—which obscures control debates behind a veil of litigation
over the scope of secured claims and the allocation of asset values.
CONCLUSION
If the history of secured lending shows anything, it shows a relentless
trend toward expanding the scope of secured creditors’ priority through
inventive commercial practice. As a consequence, debates over the scope of
secured lenders’ priority have been a persistent feature of bankruptcy law—
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a feature that is often obscured by the operation of the bankruptcy system.
The ability of a secured creditor to claim an interest in the entire value of the
debtor as an entity and not just a collection of disparate assets is an example
of such a debate. Blanket lien creditors often claim to have entity priority,
but such claims rest on complicated doctrinal arguments that are not often
made explicitly. This Article has attempted to cut through that obscurity and
provide a doctrinal foundation upon which the asset-based approach of
secured transactions law can provide effective entity priority.
That doctrinal foundation relies on the notion that the firm is a closed
system in which the firm creates cash flow during bankruptcy solely through
the use of secured creditor’s pre-bankruptcy collateral. If a secured creditor
holds a security interest in everything at the beginning of the case, the value
generated during the case is logically proceeds of that collateral. There are a
number of ways the closed system might be factually defeated through the
introduction of non-collateral into the firm’s production, and this Article has
addressed those ways. In theory and practice, however, it remains possible
for a secured creditor to cast a broad enough net prebankruptcy to obtain an
effective entity priority.
Although effective entity priority is both practically and theoretically
possible, the creation of that priority under an asset-based system relies on a
doctrinal structure that is both ill-fitting and fragile. Several commentators
have challenged the notion that secured creditors can obtain entity priority,
and recent law reform activities have been directed at eliminating some of
the foundations of the closed system theory in ways that would limit secured
creditors’ priority to an asset basis. This Article provides a preliminary case
for moving in the opposite direction, by directly embracing the ability of
secured creditors to obtain priority in the entity and not just in the assets of
the entity. By allowing secured creditors to obtain true entity priority, our
debt collection system would be enhanced by eliminating costly battles over
the allocation of value that are common to the asset-based priority structure.
The distributional effects of such a move might be directly addressed
through a system of statutory carve-outs that would provide a predictable
means of compensating involuntary and vulnerable claimants from the
additional risks that entity priority might impose.
Although the normative case for full entity priority presented here is
only preliminary, there is reason to believe that it would provide better
outcomes than the current blend of asset and entity priorities. There is
nothing inevitable about the current system, and reimagining the priority
system along these lines is a project well worth undertaking.

